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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MISREPORTING, THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, AND ADULT HEALTH
BY
AUGUSTINE DENTEH
MAY, 2018
Committee Chair: Dr. Rusty Tchernis
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation examines the causal impacts of the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) on adult weight and nutrition outcomes using novel
approaches to address nonrandom selection into the program and survey data
quality issues. The overarching objective of this study is to provide credible
estimates of the effects of SNAP to help policy makers and administrators engage in
meaningful debates and prescribe nutrition assistance policies that promote the
overall well-being of low-income Americans as well as mitigate any unintended
consequences of the largest nutrition assistance program in the United States.
The first chapter proposes a model to estimate treatment effects when program
participation is endogenously misreported. This chapter shows that failure to
account for endogenous misreporting can result in the estimate of the treatment
effect having an opposite sign from the true effect. Expressions for the asymptotic
bias of the ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) estimators
are provided and the conditions under which sign reversal may occur are discussed.
This chapter then develops a method for eliminating this bias when researchers have
access to information related to both participation and misreporting. The root-n
consistency and asymptotic normality of the proposed estimator are established

after which Monte Carlo simulations are used to demonstrate the remarkable
performance of the estimator in small samples.
The second chapter estimates the effect of SNAP on adult obesity addressing
self-selection and endogenous misreporting of participation. Using the methodology
developed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the second chapter estimates the
causal impact of SNAP on obesity using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth – 1979 cohort. From a simple partial observability model of
participation and misreporting, I predict probabilities of participation which are
used to consistently estimate the average effect of SNAP on body mass index
(BMI). The estimated misreporting model confirms some prior findings in the
literature regarding the correlates of reporting error. However, contrary to most
previous studies, I do not find any evidence of a statistically significant effect of
SNAP on BMI.
The third chapter studies the potential problems with administrative records
and their implications for econometric estimates using the National Household Food
Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) data set, which contains two different
administrative measures of SNAP participation as well as a survey-based measure.
This chapter first documents substantial ambiguity in the two administrative
participation variables and show that they disagree with each other almost as often
as they disagree with self-reported participation. Estimated participation and
misreporting rates can be meaningfully sensitive to choices made to resolve this
ambiguity and disagreement. Finally, this chapter documents similar sensitivity in
regression estimates of the associations between SNAP and food insecurity, obesity,
and the Healthy Eating Index. These results serve as a cautionary tale about
uncritically relying on linked administrative records when conducting program
evaluation research.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Obesity is one of the leading health problems in the U.S., with an adult,
age-adjusted prevalence rate of 37.7% (35% for men and 40.4% for women) as of
2014 (Flegal, Kruszon-Moran, Carroll, Fryar & Ogden 2016). The debilitating
negative consequences of obesity are well known. For instance, obesity heightens a
person’s risk of many debilitating diseases and health problems such as diabetes,
cardiovascular risk factors, lower quality of life, and many other chronic conditions
(Colditz, Willett, Rotnitzky & Manson 1995, McGee, Collaboration et al. 2005, Kim
& Kawachi 2008). Also, there are significant health care costs of obesity
(Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen & Dietz 2009, Cawley & Meyerhoefer 2012) as well as
adverse effects of obesity on labor market outcomes (Bhattacharya & Bundorf 2009).
The Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as
the Food Stamp Program, is the largest nutrition assistance program in the U.S.
that influences the diets of millions of low-income individuals and households
annually with the goal of reducing food insecurity and supporting a healthy
population. Although SNAP has no specific objective to influence obesity directly,
obtaining accurate estimates of its effects on health outcomes in general and obesity,
in particular, is critical in the broader ongoing policy debates surrounding its
existence and role in the lives of the millions of Americans who benefit from it. For
instance, understanding the causal link between SNAP and obesity can help us
understand and evaluate the merits of recent proposals aimed at influencing the
nutritional choice and well-being of participants. It is often asserted that SNAP
participation reduces food insecurity, lifts millions from poverty, and provides a
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fiscal boost to the economy during downturns without any significant adverse
impact on the health of participants (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012).
However, the high adult obesity rates coupled with a higher prevalence among
low-income households targeted by SNAP motivates a thorough understanding of
the relationship between SNAP and obesity.
Evaluating the impacts of SNAP is challenging, however. Non-random selection
of people into the program complicates the estimation of the causal impact of SNAP
on obesity. SNAP participation is a choice and hence endogenous. Participants may
differ in systematic ways from income-eligible non-participants, making it difficult to
obtain credible estimates of SNAP’s effect on obesity. Such factors as current or
expected future health, human capital characteristics, financial stability, time and
risk preferences, preferences for food and other health inputs, and attitudes toward
work are simultaneously related to SNAP participation and health outcomes (Currie
2003, Kreider, Pepper, Gundersen & Jolliffe 2012).
Several papers examine the impact of SNAP on a host of outcomes, including
poverty, food insecurity, food consumption, and weight outcomes.1 In terms of
SNAP’s relationship with obesity, a common finding is that SNAP participation is
positively correlated with the probability of being obese or overweight (Townsend,
Peerson, Love, Achterberg & Murphy 2001, Gibson 2003, Chen, Yen & Eastwood
2005, Baum 2011, Meyerhoefer & Pylypchuk 2008). However, even when one
accounts for the endogeneity of participation, the estimated treatment effects may
not be credible due to the rampant measurement error in self-reported or
survey-based participation measure.
Just like many other social programs, SNAP is substantially misreported in
survey data, sometimes with misclassification levels close to 50% (Meyer, Mok &
Sullivan 2009). When a binary regressor is misreported (or misclassified), the
1

For reviews, see Currie (2003), Bartfeld, Gundersen, Smeeding & Ziliak (2015), and Hoynes &
Schanzenbach (2016).
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measurement error is necessarily negatively correlated with the true underlying
value of the regressor, thus making the classical measurement error assumptions
implausible. While earlier researchers show that exogenous misreporting leads to
attenuation bias, the consequences of endogenous misreporting can be much more
severe. This dissertation examines the causal impacts of SNAP on adult weight and
nutrition outcomes using novel approaches to address nonrandom selection into the
program and survey data quality issues.
The first essay proposes a solution to the problem of the estimation of treatment
effects of a binary regressor in the presence of endogenous misreporting and possibly
endogenous participation. Previous studies on misclassified binary regressors are
mostly concerned with exogenous or random misreporting (Aigner 1973, Brachet
2008, Lewbel 2007, Mahajan 2006, Frazis & Loewenstein 2003), where it is
commonly assumed that misclassification probabilities depend only on the true
treatment status and are thus, independent of measurement errors and other
regressors.
Our proposed two-step estimator relaxes this arguably strong assumption and
shows that, when the researcher has access to information related to why
individuals misreport, the treatment effect can be consistently estimated. We derive
and prove the consistency and asymptotic normality of our proposed two-step
estimator and show that OLS and IV estimators are inconsistent and may yield
wrong (opposite) signs from the true effect. We also provide Monte Carlo
simulations to this effect. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to
provide point estimates of treatment effect in the context of endogenous
misreporting of a binary treatment variable.
The second chapter estimates the effect of SNAP on adult obesity addressing
self-selection and endogenous misreporting of participation using the methodology
developed in the first chapter of this dissertation. This paper examines whether

3

SNAP participation is linked to weight gain in adults when we account for the
typical case of false negative reporting errors. This paper makes two contributions.
First, using a novel approach developed in Nguimkeu, Denteh & Tchernis (2017),
this paper informs the longstanding policy discussions and debates regarding the
impacts of SNAP on recipient weight by addressing endogenous participation and
misreporting of benefit receipt. Second, the results highlight the consequences of
misreporting on estimated treatment effects in empirical work by comparing our
approach to standard estimators. I do not find evidence that SNAP participation
significantly increases weight for the full sample or separately by gender. This
finding departs from most previous studies suggesting positive impacts of SNAP on
adult weight outcomes, especially for females. Even when SNAP participation is
positively associated with BMI such as for males and the full sample, the magnitude
of the effects is not large enough to cause people of normal weight to become obese.
The third essay explores several issues that may arise from using administrative
data to overcome measurement error in program participation. A growing literature
documents the problems with relying on survey measures of program participation,
which suffer from significant reporting error when conducting impact evaluations
(Meyer, Mok & Sullivan 2015). Administrative data are ordinarily assumed to be
the “gold standard” to overcoming these econometric challenges, but relatively little
evidence exists on the potential problems with administrative records or
econometric strategies to address them.
This essay utilizes the FoodAPS data, which combines a panel of household
purchases with a survey and linked administrative data on Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) participation from both state enrollment records and
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) card expenditures to investigate these issues.
FoodAPS provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the reliability of administrative
sources of participation measures together with self-reported participation.

4

First, we document substantial ambiguity in both of the administrative measures
and show that they are only slightly more strongly correlated with each other than
with self-reported participation. Estimated SNAP participation and misreporting
rates vary with the coding rules used to resolve this ambiguity and disagreement.
We then examine the relationships between SNAP and food insecurity, obesity, and
the Healthy Eating Index. While the signs of regression estimates are not sensitive
to different coding rules, their magnitudes and levels of statistical significance
exhibit meaningful variability. In sum, these results serve as a cautionary tale about
uncritically relying on linked administrative records when conducting program
evaluation research.

5

CHAPTER 2

On the Estimation of Treatment Effects with Endogenous Misreporting

2.1

Introduction

This paper proposes a solution to the problem of identification and estimation of
treatment effects in parametric regressions when participation is endogenously
misreported. In particular, we provide a two-step estimation procedure that
consistently estimates the conditional average treatment effect. Participation in
social programs is substantially misreported in survey data, sometimes with
misclassification levels close to 50% (Meyer et al. 2009). When a binary regressor is
misreported (or misclassified), the measurement error is necessarily negatively
correlated with the underlying true value of the regressor, thus making the classical
measurement error assumptions implausible.1 While earlier papers (Aigner 1973,
Lewbel 2007) show that exogenous misreporting leads to attenuation bias, we
demonstrate that the effects of endogenous misreporting are much more severe. To
our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to provide point estimates of
treatment effects in the context of endogenous misreporting of a binary treatment
variable.
Misreporting occurs when program participants report not receiving treatment
when they actually did (“false negatives”) or vice versa (“false positives”). One-sided
misreporting (i.e., the occurrence of either false negatives or false positives) is
pervasive in practice and in many empirical studies. For example, Lynch, Marioni &
Tavaré (2007) and Meyer & Goerge (2011) report that validation studies typically
find high rates of false negatives in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
1

For empirical papers that discuss non-classical measurement errors with continuous explanatory
variables, see, e.g., Stephens & Unayama (2015), Haider & Solon (2006) and the references therein.
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(SNAP) ranging from 20% to 50%, depending on the survey and time period.2 False
positives are typically low with only less than 1.5% of non-recipients reporting
SNAP receipt(Meyer & Goerge 2011).
One-sided misreporting is not confined to government programs. For example,
according to Bound (1991), there are a number of reasons to be suspicious of any
survey response to questions concerning self-evaluated health, not only because
respondents are being asked for subjective judgments, but also because responses
may be endogenous to the outcomes we may wish to use them to explain. Brachet
(2008) argues that in health-related surveys, self-reported smoking status is
significantly misreported, with false negatives ranging from 3.4% to 73%. Other
instances of one-sided misreporting can be found in the development literature
where a firm’s formality status is often misreported, with informal firms more likely
to falsely report their status (see Gandelman & Rasteletti 2013), or the education
literature where misclassification error is more likely to arise from over-reporting of
qualifications (Battistin & Sianesi 2011).
Recognizing the documented evidence of misclassification errors, a related
literature considers the consequences of measurement errors in a binary regressor in
Monte Carlo studies. For instance, in studying the worst-case bounds of regression
coefficients under arbitrary misclassification of a binary regressor, Kreider (2010)
finds that even with misclassification error rates of less than 2%, the confidence
intervals from the contaminated data that the researcher observes and the true,
error-free data do not overlap. Similarly, Millimet (2011) studies the performance of
several estimators employed in the causal inference literature while introducing
measurement error in the treatment (binary) regressor, and cautions researchers to
be conscious of the consequences of not addressing measurement error.
2

Misreporting has also been documented for other government programs; see, e.g., Marquis
& Moore (1990) for an earlier validation study discussing measurement error in the reports of
participation in eight government transfer programs in the 1984 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).
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The existing literature has focused on accounting for random (exogenous)
misreporting when participation is exogenous. For instance, Aigner (1973) considers
misclassification in exogenous binary regressors, shows that OLS estimates are
biased downwards, and proposes a technique based on knowledge of the
misclassification probabilities to consistently estimate the parameters of interest.
More recently, Lewbel (2007) examines the identification and estimation of the
treatment effect of a misclassified binary regressor in nonparametric and
semiparametric regressions. Lewbel reaches the same attenuation-bias result that
Aigner (1973) finds and introduces assumptions that identify the conditional
average treatment effect of the misclassified binary regressor. Related works by
Bollinger (1996), Black, Berger & Scott (2000) and van Hasselt & Bollinger (2012)
provide partial identification bounds in the linear regression model, while Chen, Hu
& Lewbel (2008a,b), provide identification in the nonparametric regression model.
Some attempts have been made to address exogenous misreporting when
treatment selection (participation) is endogenous. In the education literature, Kane,
Rouse & Staiger (1999) address misreporting when estimating returns to schooling
by proposing a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that relies on the
existence of two categorical reports of educational attainment. In estimating the
effects of maternal smoking on infant health, Brachet (2008) proposes a two-step
GMM estimator, that essentially follows Hausman, Abrevaya & Scott-Morton
(1998) and Kane et al. (1999). An admitted weakness of Brachet’s approach is the
assumption that misreporting probabilities are independent of covariates,
conditional on treatment status. Frazis & Loewenstein (2003) and Mahajan (2006)
study identification with the usual IV assumptions under homogenous and
heterogenous treatment effects due to observables, respectively. More recently,
DiTraglia & García-Jimeno (2017) derive a sharp identified set under standard
first-moment assumptions and propose a Bonferroni-based procedure for
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identification robust inference. Also, Bollinger & van Hasselt (2017) use a Bayesian
approach while Ura (2017) allows for heterogeneous treatment effects due to
unobeservables in these models.
Much less is known about the case in which the regressor and the measurement
error are both endogenous. Hu, Shiu & Woutersen (2015a, 2016) provide
identification results in a class of nonseparable index models with measurement error
and endogeneity. Kreider et al. (2012) is the most closely related to our work, in the
sense that they allow for both treatment endogeneity and endogenous measurement
error in the case of binary treatment as we do in this paper. In estimating the effect
of SNAP on health outcomes, they use auxiliary administrative data on the size of
SNAP caseloads to address misreporting by bounding the average treatment effect
under increasingly stronger assumptions. While this partial identification approach
identifies treatment effects with their tightest bounds, it does not yield point
estimates. As such its relevance for policy making may not be widespread.
This paper has three salient contributions. First, we propose a parametric model
of endogenous misreporting and endogenous participation. We only analyze the case
of one-sided misreporting at this stage, which is the predominant case of
misreporting described in Meyer et al. (2009). Second, we show that when
misreporting is endogenous, OLS and IV estimators are inconsistent and OLS
estimates can be of opposite signs from the true effects (sign reversal), whether
participation is endogenous or not. We provide theoretical expressions for these
biases under the normality assumption as well as Monte Carlo simulation evidence.
Third, we propose an estimator that is root-n consistent and asymptotically normal
and show that it performs remarkably well in small samples.
Identification in our framework relies on the existence of both an additional
random variable that is correlated with the unobserved true underlying treatment,
but unrelated to the outcome and the misclassification error (e.g., Frazis &
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Loewenstein 2003, Mahajan 2006), as well as a random variable that is correlated
with the misclassification error and needs not be excluded from the outcome. Also,
we assume that the observed treatment probability is a joint (known) function of
the treatment and misclassification probabilities. This allows us to pin down the
marginal distribution of true participation and thus point-identify the treatment
effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
endogenous misreporting and shows the inconsistency of OLS and IV estimators.
Section 3 develops the proposed estimator. Section 4 provides Monte Carlo
simulations, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2

Framework

This section describes the proposed model and associated framework, and presents
our estimation strategy.
2.2.1

Model with Endogenous Misreporting

Consider the following specification of the usual treatment effects model. The
outcome variable, yi , is related to the k–vector of correctly measured exogenous
covariates, xi , and the (true) participation indicator, δi∗ , by

yi = x0i β + δi∗ α + i ,

(2.1)

δi∗ = 1 (zi0 θ + vi ≥ 0) ,

(2.2)

and we model participation as

where α is a scalar capturing the treatment effect of interest, β and θ are parameter
vectors of sizes k × 1 and q × 1 respectively, zi is a q-vector of exogenous variables
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that includes xi as well as additional instruments that are unrelated to i . In this
model, the correlation between the error terms i and vi captures the (possible)
endogeneity of participation.
However, the researcher does not observe the true participation indicator δi∗ but
only a possibly misclassified surrogate, δi , contaminated by a misreporting
unobserved dummy variable, di , such that δi = δi∗ di . In other words, an individual
correctly reports her treatment status only if di = 1 (conditional on true
participation) and reports not receiving treatment otherwise. We assume that
misreporting, di , is related to a p-vector of observable covariates wi such that
di = 1 (wi0 γ + ui ≥ 0) ,

(2.3)

where γ is a parameter vector of size p × 1 and ui is the error term. Hence, the
observed participation, δi , can be modeled by

δi = δi∗ di = 1 (zi0 θ + vi ≥ 0, wi0 γ + ui ≥ 0) .

(2.4)

Our modeling of misreported participation is generally in the spirit of a wider class
of methods that have been developed for incomplete data scenarios and specifically
similar to partial observability models studied in Poirier (1980). Partial
observability models such as Poirier’s have been widely applied in many fields of
study, including Feinstein’s examination of the problem of incomplete detection of
violations of laws and regulations (Feinstein 1990).
For the estimation, no further restrictions are imposed on xi . However, we
require the covariates zi and wi to be different but possibly overlapping and to have
sufficient variation (e.g., at least one covariate in z and in w is continuous) to avoid
the local identification problems discussed in Poirier (1980). We also make the
following basic assumptions, some of which are standard in the literature.
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Assumption 1. The error term i is independent of the exogenous variables xi , zi ,
with variance σ 2 ; and the error terms (ui , vi ) are independent of all covariates xi , zi ,
wi , and have unit variances. The correlations for the pairs (i , ui ), (i , vi ) and
(ui , vi ) are denoted ϕu , ϕv and ρ, respectively.
Assumption 2. The k × k matrix, E(xi x0i ), is nonsingular (and hence finite).

Assumption 3. The joint CDF of (−ui , −vi ) is known, and is defined by

Fu,v (u, v, ρ) = Pr[−ui ≤ u, −vi ≤ v],

for any − ∞ < u, v < +∞.

In particular, we assume that conditional on zi and wi , (−ui , −vi ) follows a
bivariate normal distribution.
Assumption 4. The error terms, (i , ui , vi ), follow a trivariate normal distribution,
conditional on all covariates xi , zi , wi . That is,

0

(i , ui , vi ) |xi , zi , wi ∼ N (0, Σ) ,

2

ϕu σ ϕv σ
 σ

with Σ = 
ρ
 ϕu σ 1

ϕv σ ρ
1




,



(2.5)

Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard. However, it is important to notice that
unlike xi and zi , the exogeneity requirement does not apply to wi , the additional
predictors of misreporting in equation (3.4). This could be of substantial interest in
practice where exogenous covariates are often difficult to find. Assumption 3 is
critical to parametrically identify the probability of true (unobserved) participation.
While we assume joint normality of the disturbance terms in the observed
participation equation for simplicity (as in Poirier 1980), normality is not needed
and the following discussion would hold for other absolutely continuous distributions
(e.g., the bivariate logistic distributions discussed in Gumbel 1961). Assumption 4 is
12

only needed to derive closed-form formulas for the OLS bias (see Section 2.2.2) and
for extensions to binary choice models and full information maximum likelihood (see
Appendix B); but it is not essential for the rest of our main discussions.
Our estimation strategy relies on observing z and w. We recognize that exclusion
restrictions for participation as well as relevant predictors for misreporting may be
difficult to obtain in practice and our suggestion is to rely on different data sources.
For instance, exclusion restrictions for participation may come from qualification
laws (eligibility requirements) for program participation. Relevant predictors of
misreporting, wi , could include peculiar features of the survey in question and its
administration such as survey date, length of survey, interview mode, etc., and the
proportion of questions to which the individual refused to respond.
2.2.2

Bias due to Endogenous Misreporting

We first show that a naive OLS estimator of the treatment effect is biased and may
assume a sign opposite to the true effect. Since the true participation status δi∗ is
unobserved and only δi is observed, the model with reported participation status
estimated by the researcher is given by

yi = x0i β + δi α + εi .

(2.6)

Given the true outcome equation defined by equation (2.1), equation (2.6) implies
that
εi = i + (δi∗ − δi ) α.

(2.7)

For a random sample of size n, equation (2.6) can be re-written in the matrix
form as follows:
y = Xβ + δα + ε,
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(2.8)

where y = [y1 , . . . , yn ]0 , X = [x1 , . . . , xn ]0 , δ = [δ1 , . . . , δn ]0 , and ε = [ε1 , . . . , εn ]0 .3
Denoting by α
bLS the OLS estimator obtained by naively estimating equation
(2.6) using reported participation δi , we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 - 4, the ordinary least squares estimator, α
bLS ,
is biased and inconsistent, and the asymptotic bias is given by

plim(b
αLS − α) =

A − αB
,
C

(2.9)

with

 0

 0

wi γ − ρzi0 θ
zi θ − ρwi0 γ
0
0
A = E σϕv φ (−zi θ) Φ p
+ σϕu φ (−wi γ) Φ p
,
1 − ρ2
1 − ρ2
B = E(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E[(δi∗ − δi )xi ] and C = E(δi ) − E(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E(δi xi ),
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are respectively the pdf and cdf of the standard normal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since the denominator in (2.9), C, is always positive by the Cauchy-Schwarz
Inequality (see, e.g., Tripathi 1999) the sign of the asymptotic bias only depends on
the numerator of the expression. For example, if B > 0, then plim(b
αLS ) < α for all
α > A/B (i.e., there is an attenuation bias) and plim(b
αLS ) > α for all α < A/B
(i.e., there is an expansion bias). Also there are many instances in which plim(b
αLS )
and α will have opposite signs. For example, if B − C < 0, then plim(b
αLS ) and α
have opposite signs whenever α lays between A/(B − C) and 0 (Figure 2.1 depicts
the regions where bias and sign switching occur in this case).
Note that sign-switching can occur even when participation is exogenous.
Without loss of generality, consider the case of exogenous participation (i.e ϕv = 0).
3

Re-writing the model in matrix notation is not necessary but makes the exposition (especially
the proofs) less cumbersome. The matrix form also gives alternative (simpler) expressions for the
various estimators considered.
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The sign-switching result depicted in Figure 2.1 follows if (i) A > 0, (ii) B − C < 0,
and (iii) A/(B − C) < α < 0. Condition (i) holds if misreporting is endogenous and
the disturbance terms in equations (2.1) and (3.4) are positively correlated
(ϕu > 0). Thus, the size of the sign-switching region depends on how large the ratio
A/(B − C) is in general. In particular, in our example, the size of the sign-switching
region increases with the rate of false negatives and the variance of the error term in
the outcome equation, and decreases with the rate of true participation, ceteris
paribus. We provide evidence on the sign-switching region and these relationships in
our Monte Carlo study in Section 2.4.
The above discussion shows that the consequence of misreporting is not merely
an attenuation bias as found in many other studies (e.g., Aigner 1973, Black et al.
2000, Lewbel 2007). Under endogenous misreporting, the estimated treatment effect
can possibly assume an opposite sign, yielding misleading policy prescriptions. This
sign reversal phenomenon would generally occur when misreporting is significant
and the direction of its correlation with the outcome is opposite to the direction of
the treatment effect. For example, in the SNAP participation and obesity
relationship, much empirical work have relied on self-reported SNAP participation
and have found a positive or no effect on obesity. But, if people who are overweight
are also more likely to correctly report SNAP participation (i.e., A positive) and
since, as mentioned above, misreporting in SNAP is very severe in the data ( i.e.,
B − C is negative with a small magnitude) then we could observe a positive
relationship between SNAP participation and obesity (i.e. plimα̂LS > 0) even if the
true effect is negative (i.e. α < 0).
In the next section, we provide an estimation strategy that allows consistent
estimation of the treatment effect, α. But first, we examine how well an IV
estimation strategy would perform in our framework.
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2.2.3

IV Estimator under Endogenous Misreporting

The misreporting mechanism described above shows that in equation (2.6), the
regressor δi is correlated with the error term εi as implied by equation (2.7). Thus,
equation (2.1) can be seen as a regression with an endogenous binary regressor, even
if true participation is exogenous and only misreporting is endogenous. So it may be
tempting to suppose that if an instrument is present, then a standard IV estimator
will address the issue raised in our framework. Here, we show that this is not the
case.
Suppose we have access to a valid instrumental variable, zi , such that E[zi εi ] = 0
and Cov(zi , δi ) 6= 0, and assume, for simplicity, that zi is a scalar so that α is just
identified. Then the (simple) instrumental variable estimator is given by

α
bIV = (z 0 M δ)−1 z 0 M y,
where M = I − X(X 0 X)−1 X 0 is the orthogonal projection matrix onto the null
space of X.
We can show using the same reasoning as above that,

plim(b
αIV ) =

E(zi δi∗ ) − E(zi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E(xi δi∗ )
α.
E(zi δi ) − E(zi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E[xi δi ]

(2.10)

Thus, the IV estimator of α is inconsistent, and we cannot sign the bias in general.
However, in the special case where misreporting is uncorrelated with true
participation and the other covariates, it can be shown that,

plim(b
αIV ) =

α
α
=
,
E[di ]
Pr[di = 1]

so that

|plim(b
αIV )| > |α|.

Hence, in this specific scenario, the IV estimator is upwardly biased. This result is
similar to those obtained by Black et al. (2000), (see also Frazis & Loewenstein
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2003, Brachet 2008). The finding that the IV estimator is inconsistent is not new,
given the results of the above authors and others. However, Black et al. (2000)
showed that the IV estimator yields an expansion bias, which corresponds to the
special case of exogenous measurement errors. By contrast, as suggested by
equation (2.10), the sign of the IV bias is not obvious when misreporting is
endogenous, and our simulations show that the ensuing bias can take either
direction (i.e., expansion or attenuation).
We now present an estimation procedure that delivers consistent and
asymptotically normal estimates for the treatment effect, α.
2.3

The Proposed Estimator

Recall that our objective is to estimate α in the outcome equation (2.1), where true
(and possibly endogenous) participation status, δi∗ , is unobserved, but only a
possibly misreported (and possibly endogenous) participation status, δi , is observed.
The proposed estimation strategy proceeds in the following two steps.
1. With the joint distribution of ui and vi given by Fu,v (u, v, ρ), use the partial
observability probit model given by equation (2.4) to estimate the parameter
vectors θ and γ. Then, compute the predicted probability for person i’s true
participation status as δ̂i∗ = Φ(zi0 θ̂).
2. Estimate equation (2.1) by substituting δ̂i∗ for δi∗ . Assuming correct model
specification and distribution of the error terms, the resulting two-step
estimator of α is consistent. Moreover, with standard regularity assumptions,
this estimator is asymptotically normal.
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2.3.1

First Step Estimation

Following Poirier (1980), the parameters γ, θ and ρ can be jointly estimated from
the joint distribution of the error terms using the binary choice model defined by

Pr[δi = 1|wi , zi ] = Pr [−ui ≤ wi0 γ, − vi ≤ zi0 θ] = Fu,v (wi0 γ, zi0 θ, ρ) = Pi (γ, θ, ρ).

The log-likelihood function of this model is given by

Ln (γ, θ, ρ) =

n
X

δi ln Pi (γ, θ, ρ) + (1 − δi ) ln (1 − Pi (γ, θ, ρ)) .

i=1

The maximum likelihood estimator of the vector of parameters (γ, θ, ρ) is
consistent and asymptotically normal, and the covariance matrix consistently
estimated with the inverse of the information matrix. In particular, for the
parameter θ, the MLE θ̂ is consistent and asymptotically normal, i.e.,
p

θ̂−→ θ

and

√

d

n(θ̂ − θ)−→ N (0, Vθ ) ,

where the asymptotic variance of θ̂ is obtained from the information matrix
equality as
 
Vθ = E

1
∂Pi ∂Pi
Pi (1 − Pi ) ∂θ ∂θ0

−1
.

(2.11)

From this expression, a consistent estimator for the variance matrix can be obtained
as
"

n
∂ Pbi ∂ Pbi
1X
1
b
Vθ =
n i=1 Pbi (1 − Pbi ) ∂θ ∂θ0

#−1
,

(2.12)



where Pbi = Pi (γ̂, θ̂, ρ̂) = Fu,v wi0 γ̂, zi0 θ̂, ρ̂ . For the normal case, the gradient takes a
fairly simple form
∂ Pbi
= φ(zi0 θ̂)Φ
∂θ

wi0 γ̂ − ρ̂zi0 θ̂
p
1 − ρ̂2
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Since this first-step is a maximum likelihood, parametric identification of (θ, γ, ρ)
can be discussed in terms of non-singularity of the corresponding information
matrix (Rothenberg 1971). This means perfect multicollinearity needs to be ruled
out, implying that both wi and zi should satisfy the standard rank conditions as a
basic requirement. In addition, as we explained earlier, a single exclusion restriction
between wi and zi (i.e., at least one covariate in zi should not be relevant in wi , or
vice-versa) is sufficient to identify all the first step parameters locally (Poirier
1980).4 Also, notice that only the (correct) specification of the marginal distribution
of v is necessary for the parametric identification and estimation of the model in the
second step. If the distribution of u or the joint distribution of (u, v) are unknown,
one may still obtain a consistent estimator of θ in the first step by using a
semiparametric approach such as the series expansion of the joint PDF of (u, v)
proposed by ? or the single equation multiple index model described in Ichimura &
Lee (1991).
2.3.2

Second Step Estimation

In the second step, we compute the predicted values of true unobserved
participation δi∗ , given by δ̂i∗ = Φ(zi0 θ̂), which are used in lieu of δi∗ to estimate the
parameters of the new model given by

yi = x0i β + δ̂i∗ α + ηi .

(2.13)

Using the same approach as above, the second step estimator is obtained as
0

0

α
b2S = (δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗ )−1 δ̂ ∗ M y
Pn
Pn
Pn
Pn
0
0
0
0 −1
i=1 Φ(zi θ̂)yi −
i=1 Φ(zi θ̂)xi [
i=1 xi xi ]
i=1 xi yi
= Pn
P
P
P
n
n
n
0 2
0
0
0 −1
0
i=1 Φ(zi θ̂) −
i=1 Φ(zi θ̂)xi [
i=1 xi xi ]
i=1 xi Φ(zi θ̂)
4

(2.14)

Essentially, identification implies much stronger conditions than the standard rank condition
for linear IV, since it requires that participation and hence the (nonlinear) relationship between true
treatment and instruments be fully parameterized and correctly specified.
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We have the following consistency result.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, the two-step estimator is consistent for α,
p

that is, α
b2S −→ α.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Notice that only the component θ̂ of the parameter vector is used at this second
stage to predict the true unobserved participation status. The other components, γ̂
and ρ̂ are only used in the computation of the asymptotic variance estimator, as
described below. In this second step, exclusion restriction is not strictly needed for
identification as long as nonlinearity in the marginal distribution of vi is assumed.
We have the following asymptotic normality result.
Theorem 3. Under the model assumptions the two-step estimator is asymptotically
normal, i.e.,
√
d
n(b
α2S − α)−→ N (0, σα2 )
with

σα2

σ2
α2 E[Λi (θ)φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]V (θ̂)E[zi φ(zi0 θ)Λi (θ)] α2 E[Λ2i (θ)Φ(zi0 θ)(1 − Φ(zi0 θ))]
+
+
=
E[Λ2i (θ)]2
E[Λ2i (θ)]2
E[Λ2i (θ)]

where
Λi (θ) = Φ(zi0 θ) − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 xi
Proof. See Appendix A.
This result is an application of the central limit theorem in the context of
two-step estimators, and is useful for our procedure to be readily usable for
parametric inference. An expression for the variance estimator σ
bα2 of σα2 is given in
the Appendix. However, this variance is quite involved and can be difficult to
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estimate. In practice, a simpler approach to evaluate the precision of α
b2S and make
inference about the treatment effect α is to use a bootstrap.
Summarizing, the outcome equation requires true participation status, δ ∗ , which
is unobserved to the econometrician. Given the observed participation, δ, the first
step in our estimation procedure amounts to a partial observability probit analysis
on the indicator variable δ using both z and w, which are respectively the
instrumental variables driving true participation and the covariates related to
misreporting. The result of this analysis is an estimator, θ̂, of θ, the coefficient of z,
which allows constructing a proxy δ̂ ∗ for truly being a participant. By construction,
this proxy is purged from both endogeneity and misreporting, and is then used in
lieu of δ ∗ in the outcome equation of interest to derive a consistent treatment effect
estimator. The estimate θ̂ obtained from the first step can then be used along with
the other model estimates to compute a consistent variance estimator for the
treatment effect estimator.
A natural alternative to our two-step procedure is to estimate our model
equations jointly via maximum likelihood (ML). Under appropriate assumptions, the
ML procedures yield more efficient estimators and asymptotically correct estimates
of standard errors. Unfortunately, in many situations, due to sample size and other
considerations, the ML estimation can be both computationally complex and costly
to implement, which may limit its use. For example, the correlations between the
outcome equation error and the participation and reporting equations errors, ϕu and
ϕv , might not be strongly identified, resulting in a likelihood function with ridges or
multiple local maxima. In addition, in some applications, the researcher may be
reluctant to hypothesize a specific joint distribution between the random errors of
the observed participation and the outcome as is required by maximum likelihood.5
5

In the Appendix, we briefly discuss the ML estimation of this model under the assumption of
joint (trivariate) normality of the errors. In the same vein, we also briefly discuss how our method
can be extended to the case of binary outcomes.
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While this framework focuses on one-sided misreporting (i.e., either only false
negatives or false positives) which may be more appealing in certain contexts (e.g.,
when studying scenarios of participation in risky behavior or activities associated
with stigma), a more general framework should account for misreporting in both
directions (i.e., both false negatives and false positives). In the following section, we
provide Monte Carlo simulations results on the performance of our estimator for
both the one-sided case and the case where there is a small amount of
misclassification in the other direction.6
2.4

Monte Carlo Simulations

This section presents the results of Monte Carlo simulations comparing the
proposed two-step estimator (2S) with OLS and IV estimators. Our goal is to
consistently estimate α, the (conditional) average treatment effect of participation,
δ ∗ , on an outcome, y, given by equation (2.1). However, since true participation is
unobserved, our task reduces to use the proposed method to estimate α from
equation (2.6) under the assumption that observed (misclassified) participation, δ,
arises according to the process described by equation (2.4). In the simulations, we
also consider a slight departure from equation (2.4) and allow for small amounts of
false positives as described below.
2.4.1

Simulation setup

The baseline data generating process is simulated as follows. The true treatment
indicator, δi∗ , is given by
δi∗ = 1 (θ0 + θ1 zi + vi ≥ 0) ,

where zi ∼ N (0, 1),

6

θ0 = 0.1,

θ1 = 1.

Extending this framework to the two-sided endogenous misreporting case is not straightforward. It would require at least two sets of excluded covariates, that is, w1 and w2 , each associated
with one of the misreporting directions, and possibly other additional functional form/distributional
assumptions for identification.
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The outcome equation yi is given by
yi = β0 + xi β1 + δi∗ α + i

where xi ∼ N (0, 1) β0 = β1 = 1,

α = −0.2.

Note that α = −0.2 is the true population treatment effect we seek to estimate.
The econometrician only observes an error-ridden treatment indicator, δi ,
defined by
δi = δi∗ 1 (γ0 + γ1 wi + ui ≥ c) + (1 − δi∗ )1 (ζi < b) ,
where wi ∼ N (0, 1), γ0 = 0.01, γ1 = 2, and b ∈ [0, 1).
The parameter c is the threshold that determines the proportion of false
negatives in the sample.7 The disturbance term, ζi , is drawn from a uniform (0, 1)
distribution independently from zi and vi so that the parameter b corresponds to
the rate of false positives. For example, when b = 0 (baseline case), the observed
treatment indicator is given by δi = δi∗ 1 (γ0 + γ1 wi + ui ≥ c) which only allows for
false negatives as given by equation (2.4). However, when b > 0, the observed
treatment indicator allows for both false negatives and a (100 × b)% rate of false
positives.
The disturbances i , ui and vi are drawn from a trivariate distribution given by

(i , ui , vi ) ∼ IID (0, Σ) ,

2

ϕu σ ϕ v σ
 σ

where Σ = 
ρ
 ϕu σ 1

ϕv σ ρ
1




,



σ = 1.

The baseline results assume joint normality although we consider non-normal
distributions as well. The values of the parameters ϕv and ϕu , which are the
correlations of the outcome equation error term with participation and misreporting
equation disturbance terms, respectively, are varied in the simulations to examine
7

By appropriately choosing the value of c, one can simulate varying rates of misreporting.
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how various degrees of the endogeneity of participation and misreporting with
respect to the outcome impact the results. We also allow ρ, the correlation between
participation and misreporting to vary. We estimate the treatment effect α and the
associated bias using the naive OLS approach, α̂LS and the proposed two-step
approach, α̂2S . We also estimate the instrumental variable estimators α̂IV 1 and α̂IV 2
using z and [z, w] as instruments, respectively.
2.4.2

Simulation Results

We report simulation results averaged over 1000 replications each with sample size
5000 for different levels of false negatives (0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%), ρ ∈ {0, 0.3},
ϕu ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.8} and ϕv ∈ {−0.3, 0, 0.3}. These results are first presented for
b = 0 (i.e., 0% false positives) and, subsequently, for b ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1} (i.e., 1%,
5% and 10% false positives). Thus, no misreporting corresponds to the case of 0%
false negatives and false positives. The cases of exogenous participation and
exogenous misreporting correspond to ϕu = ϕv = 0. Table 2.1 presents the results of
the Monte Carlo simulations for OLS, IVs, and the proposed two-step (2S)
estimators when the errors are jointly normal, the false positive rate is 0%, and
ρ = 0.3. We report both the OLS estimates using the true treatment indicator, δi∗
(OLS-T) and the observed treatment indicator δi (OLS-O). Although δi∗ is
unobserved to the econometrician, the OLS-T estimates provide a theoretical
benchmark for the estimates obtained using the misclassified δi . We also report
both the IV estimates using z as an instrument (IV-1) and those using [z, w] as
instruments (IV-2). The proposed estimator is denoted (2S) in the tables.
The naive OLS estimates using δi (OLS-O) show that, not only is the OLS
estimator inconsistent as asserted in Theorem 1, but also yields the wrong (i.e.,
positive) sign, whether participation is exogenous or endogenous. Sign switching is
observed at all nonzero false negative rates i.e. 5%, 10%, 20% and 40% and is more
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pronounced at higher values of ϕu . These results persist even under the special case
of exogenous misreporting (ϕu = 0). The IV estimates (IV-1) and (IV-2) show that
the classic IV estimator is also inconsistent and sometimes worse than the OLS,
albeit keeping the correct (negative) sign.8 Interestingly, IV-1 estimates exhibit
expansion biases while IV-2 estimates are attenuated. This confirms, as we
explained in Section 2.2.3, that we cannot generally sign the bias in the IV
estimator when misreporting is endogenous. In contrast, the proposed two-step
estimator (2S), presented in the last column of Table 2.1, yields consistent estimates
of the true treatment effect and by comparison, is superior to both the OLS and IV
estimators under both endogenous and exogenous misreporting or participation. In
addition, the proposed estimator remains accurate and performs remarkably well,
even when the rate of false negatives is substantially high in the data. Moreover,
there is no cost in doing our procedure since the proposed estimator remains as
good as the OLS and the IV when there is 0% false negatives and participation is
exogenous (ϕv = 0). This performance is not sensitive to the choice of parameters
such as the variance of the outcome equation error or the correlation between the
error terms in the participation and misreporting equations (see, e.g., the results for
ρ = 0 in the ‘Baseline’ column of Table 2.2).
To further assess the robustness of our proposed estimator, we investigate its
sensitivity to misspecification in a number of directions. First, we allow the reported
participation to include both false negatives (as before) and a small amount of false
positives. We consider false positive rates of 1%, 5%, and 10%. Second, we allow for
the error terms to be non-normal. We consider both the trivariate Gamma
distribution and the trivariate Chi-squared distribution as alternatives to allow

8

This is actually a better set of simulations for IV-2 because the covariate wi can be used as an
additional instrument to improve the IV. Additional simulations with wi being endogenous yielded
worse results for this IV while the proposed estimator (2S) remained consistent.

25

more skewness and kurtosis in the distributions of error terms.9 Third, we allow for
the misreporting equation to be misspecified by considering the case where the
predictor is unavailable to the researcher (i.e., only x is included) or by introducing
a quadratic term in w in the data generating process but turns out to be omitted by
the researcher in the estimation. Fourth, we introduce correlation between the
predictors of misreporting w and the error terms in both participation and outcome
equations.
Table 2.2 summarizes the results where ρ and ϕv are fixed to zero (exogenous
participation) and the focus is on the sensitivity to different degrees of endogeneity
of misreporting ϕu and various rates of false negatives. These results show that at
any false positive rate the bias increases with false negative rates. Interestingly, for
small amounts of false positives, the proposed estimator still performs quite well,
although it gets worse with higher rates of false positives. Specifically, when false
positive rates range from 1% to 5%, the median value of the proposed estimator
(2S) ranges between −0.2042 and −0.2180 for all ranges of false negatives in our
setting. The proposed estimator is robust to non-normality of the error terms and
remains consistent when the true error distributions are Gamma or Chi-Squared in
this setting. When the misreporting equation is misspecified by including only the
covariates from the outcome equation (i.e., only x) or when this equation includes a
quadratic term in w that is omitted by the researcher in the estimation, the 2S
estimator still performs well. Finally, the 2S estimator is robust to introducing
correlations between the predictor w and both the outcome and misreporting
equation errors. When w is correlated with the outcome equation or the
misreporting equation errors, the 2S estimator remains consistent. However, the 2S
estimator performs poorly, exhibiting an attenuation bias just like the IV-1, when w
and the participation equation error are correlated. Our recommendation is to
9

These multivariate distributions can be simulated using the Copulas method or the inverse
transformation method as decribed in ?
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access w and z from different data sources to minimize the chances of having w
endogenous to true participation in practice.
There are a few additional facts that are worth mentioning. On the one hand, it
is not surprising that the OLS estimator only works well when there are 0% false
negatives and participation is exogenous (ϕv = 0). On the other hand, the IV
estimator tends to work well for low levels of false negatives (0% - 5%) but gets
worse for higher false negative rates (10% and higher). As explained earlier, the
sign-reversal regions for the OLS depends on the quantity A/(B − C) (given in
Theorem 1), which varies with ϕv , ϕu , σ, and the extent of misclassification. Even
when participation is exogenous (i.e. ϕv = 0), various degrees of endogeneity of
misreporting (e.g., ϕu ∈ {−0.8, −0.2, 0, 0.2, 0.8, }), various sizes of the error
variance (e.g., σ ∈ {1, 4}), and various rates of false negatives (e.g., 5%, 10%, 40%)
yield different sign-switching regions for the OLS, as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 shows the ranges of the true treatment effects α for which the OLS
estimator α̂LS would yield the wrong (opposite) signs in our simulation design. For
example, negative correlations between misreporting and outcome errors yield
positive intervals of the treatment effect for which the OLS takes the wrong
(negative) sign, while positive correlations between misreporting and outcome errors
yield negative intervals of the true treatment effect for which the OLS takes the
wrong (positive) sign. In all cases, higher levels of endogeneity of misreporting,
higher rates of false positives or greater error variance in the outcome equation yield
wider sign-reversal intervals. It is only when misreporting is also exogenous
(ϕu = 0) that the OLS keeps the same sign as the true treatment effect (albeit still
biased), so that the sign-switching set is empty (see Table 2.3).
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2.5

Conclusion

This study examines the identification and estimation of the conditional average
treatment effect of a binary regressor in the presence of endogenous misreporting
and possibly endogenous participation. We derive and prove the consistency and
asymptotic normality of our proposed two-step estimator and show that OLS and
IV estimators are inconsistent and may yield wrong (opposite) signs from the true
effect. We also provide Monte Carlo simulations to this effect. Previous studies on
misclassified binary regressors are mostly concerned with exogenous or random
misreporting (Aigner 1973, Brachet 2008, Lewbel 2007, Mahajan 2006, Frazis &
Loewenstein 2003), where it is commonly assumed that misclassification
probabilities depend only on the true treatment status and are thus, independent of
measurement errors and other regressors. Our two-step estimator relaxes this
arguably strong assumption and shows that, when the researcher has access to
information related to why individuals misreport, the treatment effect can be
consistently estimated.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to provide point estimates of
treatment effect in the context of endogenous misreporting of a binary treatment
variable. This is important because of the prevalence of misreporting in public
programs and survey data (Meyer et al. 2009, Bollinger 1996, Kane & Rouse 1995,
Kane et al. 1999, Brachet 2008). While this paper focused on one-sided endogenous
misreporting when participation is possibly endogenous, future work should allow
for bidirectional misreporting (i.e., false negatives and false positives). It would also
be useful to show the level of dependence of our approach on distributional and
functional form assumptions by considering parametric or semi-parametric
estimation approaches.
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2.6

Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the OLS bias
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Table 2.1: Monte Carlo Simulations
False
Negatives

ϕu

0

0%

0.2

0.8

0

5%

0.2

0.8

0

10%

0.2

0.8

0

20%

0.2

0.8

0

40%

0.2

0.8

ϕv

OLS-T

OLS-O

-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.5
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3
-0.3
0
0.3

-0.5523
-0.1997
0.1519
-0.5524
-0.2021
0.1508
-0.5507
-0.1994
0.1523
-0.5499
-0.1987
0.1504
-0.5513
-0.2008
0.1513
-0.5506
-0.1993
0.1516
-0.5515
-0.2013
0.1524
-0.5499
-0.1989
0.1518
-0.5513
-0.1986
0.1514
-0.5508
-0.1990
0.1501
-0.5518
-0.2004
0.1498
-0.5511
-0.2015
0.1512
-0.5502
-0.2008
0.1506
-0.5501
-0.2015
0.1507
-0.5509
-0.2005
0.1514

-0.5523
-0.1997
0.1519
-0.5524
-0.2021
0.1508
-0.5507
-0.1994
0.1523
-0.5066
-0.1834
0.1357
-0.4827
-0.1611
0.1615
-0.4072
-0.0844
0.2371
-0.4649
-0.1715
0.1250
-0.4203
-0.1266
0.1677
-0.2916
0.0053
0.2987
-0.4065
-0.1496
0.1050
-0.3421
-0.0858
0.1693
-0.1443
0.1097
0.3680
-0.3161
-0.1198
0.0783
-0.2181
-0.0230
0.1743
0.0675
0.2646
0.4607

IV-1
[x,z]
-0.2006
-0.2014
-0.1951
-0.2036
-0.2011
-0.1983
-0.1991
-0.2003
-0.1985
-0.2041
-0.2018
-0.2069
-0.2061
-0.2063
-0.2054
-0.2044
-0.2039
-0.2036
-0.1949
-0.1936
-0.1922
-0.1960
-0.1942
-0.1952
-0.1953
-0.1936
-0.1937
-0.1674
-0.1681
-0.1690
-0.1733
-0.1690
-0.1730
-0.1690
-0.1675
-0.1709
-0.1215
-0.1219
-0.1210
-0.1160
-0.1213
-0.1191
-0.1207
-0.1189
-0.1211

IV-2
[x,z,w]
-0.2003
-0.2013
-0.1954
-0.2033
-0.2012
-0.1986
-0.1988
-0.2003
-0.1987
-0.2152
-0.2127
-0.2188
-0.2166
-0.2168
-0.2167
-0.2158
-0.2160
-0.2146
-0.2345
-0.2319
-0.2323
-0.2350
-0.2305
-0.2339
-0.2340
-0.2331
-0.2350
-0.2668
-0.2666
-0.2681
-0.2728
-0.2665
-0.2743
-0.2679
-0.2668
-0.2728
-0.3740
-0.3814
-0.3746
-0.3687
-0.3852
-0.3788
-0.3757
-0.3789
-0.3783

2S
-0.1998
-0.2009
-0.1963
-0.2030
-0.1999
-0.1972
-0.1980
-0.1993
-0.1962
-0.1997
-0.1980
-0.2012
-0.2001
-0.2009
-0.2009
-0.2013
-0.2007
-0.2003
-0.2000
-0.1991
-0.1992
-0.2008
-0.1973
-0.1995
-0.1998
-0.1978
-0.2005
-0.1984
-0.1989
-0.2002
-0.2036
-0.1992
-0.2026
-0.1988
-0.1990
-0.2034
-0.1981
-0.2027
-0.1987
-0.1963
-0.2041
-0.2003
-0.1993
-0.2016
-0.2000

The true treatment effect is α = −0.2. Each calibration in the Monte Carlo Design involved 1000 replications each
of size 5000. We report results for five false negative rates (0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%) – the proportion of true
participants who misreport their status. ϕv and ϕu are correlations that indicate the extents of endogeneity of
participation and misreporting, respectively. The correlation between participation and misreporting is ρ = 0.3. Also,
the error terms are jointly normally distributed and the false positive rate is 0%.
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Table 2.2: Sensitivity of the Proposed Estimator to Misspecification
Types of Misspecification of Baseline
False

ϕu

Baseline

Negatives
0%

5%

10%

20%

40%

0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8

-0.2000
-0.1970
-0.1981
-0.2041
-0.1974
-0.1989
-0.1987
-0.2001
-0.1983
-0.2018
-0.1989
-0.2003
-0.1961
-0.2000
-0.2009

1%

False Positives
5%

10%

-0.2021
-0.2003
-0.2008
-0.2057
-0.2074
-0.2035
-0.2029
-0.2060
-0.2027
-0.2063
-0.2056
-0.2036
-0.2066
-0.2085
-0.2087

-0.2141
-0.2126
-0.2129
-0.2191
-0.2208
-0.2169
-0.2169
-0.2207
-0.2171
-0.2234
-0.2229
-0.2210
-0.2314
-0.2333
-0.2336

-0.2291
-0.2257
-0.2266
-0.2317
-0.2312
-0.2320
-0.2323
-0.2331
-0.2350
-0.2428
-0.2411
-0.2377
-0.2652
-0.2628
-0.2598

Endogeneity of Predictor
corr(w, )
corr(w, u)
corr(w, v)
= .5
= .5
= .5
0%

5%

10%

20%

40%

0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8
0
0.2
0.8

-0.2000
-0.1970
-0.1981
-0.2041
-0.1974
-0.1989
-0.1987
-0.2001
-0.1983
-0.2018
-0.1989
-0.2003
-0.1961
-0.2000
-0.2009

-0.1975
-0.2008
-0.1995
-0.1988
-0.2012
-0.1985
-0.2017
-0.1972
-0.1991
-0.1954
-0.2008
-0.1988
-0.2003
-0.1974
-0.2004

-0.1975
-0.2008
-0.1995
-0.1988
-0.2013
-0.1984
-0.2018
-0.1973
-0.1992
-0.1954
-0.2008
-0.1989
-0.2004
-0.1974
-0.2000

-0.1738
-0.1765
0.1754
-0.1752
-0.1773
-0.1743
-0.1776
-0.1741
-0.1759
-0.1712
-0.1763
-0.1742
-0.1732
-0.1705
-0.1732

Distribution of errors
Γ(3, 1)
χ2(1)
-0.2047
-0.1971
-0.1967
-0.2077
-0.1935
-0.1957
-0.1972
-0.2007
-0.1955
-0.2013
-0.1966
-0.1970
-0.1873
-0.1977
-0.2004

-0.2110
-0.2077
-0.2090
-0.2059
-0.2094
-0.2082
-0.2051
-0.2042
-0.2057
-0.2037
-0.2064
-0.2073
-0.2058
-0.2107
-0.2104

Omission of Predictor
omitted
omitted∗
w
w2
-0.1972
-0.2017
-0.1980
-0.1956
-0.1979
-0.1981
-0.1965
-0.2008
-0.2013
-0.2004
-0.1996
-0.2008
-0.2022
-0.1975
-0.1969

-0.2009
-0.1986
-0.1967
-0.2035
-0.2012
-0.1981
-0.2001
-0.1990
-0.2009
-0.1981
-0.1997
-0.1990
-0.2027
-0.2025
-0.2037

The true treatment effect is α = −0.2. We fix ρ = ϕv = 0. Each calibration in the Monte Carlo Design involved 1000
replications each of size 5000. We report results for five false negatives rates (0%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%) and false
positive rates of (0%, 1%, 5%, and 10%). The correlation ϕu indicates the extent of endogeneity of misreporting.
∗ Here, the true misreporting equation includes both w and w 2 , but the estimation omits w 2 .
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Table 2.3: Sign-switching intervals of α for the OLS
False
Negatives

5%

10%

40%

Sign-switching region

ϕu

σ=1
[0, 0.2307]
[0, 0.0577]
∅
[−0.0577, 0]
[−0.2307, 0]
[0, 0.4054]
[0, 0.1033]
∅
[-0.1033, 0]
[-0.4054, 0]
[0, 1.1347]
[0, 0.3399]
∅
[-0.3399, 0]
[-1.1347, 0]

-0.8
-0.2
0
0.2
0.8
-0.8
-0.2
0
0.2
0.8
-0.8
-0.2
0
0.2
0.8

σ=4
[0, 0.9227]
[0, 0.2309]
∅
[−0.2309, 0]
[−0.9227, 0]
[0, 1.6216]
[0, 0.8368]
∅
[-0.8368, 0]
[-1.6216, 0]
[0, 5.3786]
[0, 1.3597]
∅
[-1.3597, 0]
[-5.3786, 0]

Results are reported for three false negatives rates (5%, 10%, and 40%). The correlation ϕu
indicates the extent of endogeneity of misreporting; ϕv and ρ are fixed to 0.
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CHAPTER 3

The Effect of SNAP on Obesity in the Presence of Endogenous
Misreporting

3.1

Introduction

This paper estimates the casual effect of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) on adult Body Mass Index (BMI) when participation is
endogenously misreported.1 SNAP is the largest nutrition assistance program in the
U.S., serving millions of low-income individuals and households in an effort to
reduce food insecurity and support a healthy population. High adult obesity rates
coupled with a higher prevalence among low-income households targeted by SNAP
motivates a thorough understanding of the relationship between SNAP and obesity.2
Since obesity remains a public health or policy concern, it is of interest to
policymakers to know whether SNAP and any other government program have any
unintended consequences for the weight of recipients. For instance, if SNAP affects
the weight of recipients, then the size of the negative externalities associated with
obesity would need to incorporate these effects (Bhattacharya & Sood 2006, Bailey
2013). Also, knowing whether there are any such effects can inform debates
regarding proposals to restructure SNAP.
It is often asserted that SNAP participation reduces food insecurity, lifts millions
1

SNAP was formerly called the Food Stamp Program (FSP).
Descriptive empirical evidence suggests that lower incomes are associated with higher probabilities of obesity and severe obesity and this gradient is more pronounced for women. For instance,
using the 2001-2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) data, Gundersen (2015) finds that obesity rates (BMI≥30) decline from 36.3% to 31.3% moving from below the
federal poverty level to above 400% of the federal poverty level, while severe obesity rates (BMI≥35)
declines from 19.1% to 13.0%. Also, using NHANES data from 2007-2010, Condon, Drilea, Jowers, Lichtenstein, Mabli, Madden & Niland (2015) reports that adult SNAP participants were more
likely to be obese compared to income-eligible nonparticipants (43.6% vs. 33.3%) and higher-income
nonparticipants (43.6% vs. 31.9%).
2
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from poverty, and provides a fiscal boost to the economy during downturns without
any significant adverse impact on the health of participants (U.S. Department of
Agriculture 2012). However, existing research on the relationship between SNAP
participation and obesity is mixed, inconclusive, and deserves closer examination
especially because the low-income households targeted by SNAP are also relatively
more vulnerable with respect to obesity risk factors and other negative health
conditions (Bitler 2015, Gundersen 2015). Obesity is one of the leading health
problems in the U.S., with an adult, age-adjusted prevalence rate of 37.7% (35% for
men and 40.4% for women) as of 2014 (Flegal et al. 2016). Obesity heightens a
person’s risk of many debilitating diseases and health problems such as diabetes,
cardiovascular risk factors, lower quality of life, and many other chronic conditions
(Colditz et al. 1995, McGee et al. 2005, Kim & Kawachi 2008). In addition, there
are significant health care costs of obesity (Finkelstein et al. 2009, Cawley &
Meyerhoefer 2012) as well as negative effects of obesity on labor market outcomes
(Bhattacharya & Bundorf 2009). It is against this backdrop that providing credible
estimates of SNAP’s relationship with recipient body weight remains critical for
policymaking bodies and administrators.
Although SNAP has no specific objective to influence obesity directly, obtaining
accurate estimates of its effects on health outcomes in general and obesity in
particular is critical in the broader ongoing policy debates surrounding its existence
and role in the lives of the millions of Americans who benefit from it. For instance,
understanding the causal link between SNAP and obesity can help us understand
and evaluate the merits of recent proposals aimed at influencing the nutritional
choice and well-being of participants. Gundersen (2015) discusses state- and
national-level proposals aimed at restricting the food choices of participants and
prohibiting the purchase of foods deemed as “unhealthy” or “junk.” For instance, a
much publicized proposal is the State of New York’s waiver request to the U.S.
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Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 2010 to permit a two-year demonstration
project that will ban the use of SNAP benefits to purchase any beverage with more
than 10 calories per 8-ounce serving (Gundersen 2015, Kansagra, Kennelly, Nonas,
Curtis, Van Wye, Goodman & Farley 2015). The State of New York’s proposal
which would have banned sports drinks, soda, vegetable drinks and iced tea while
allowing others such as milk and 100% fruit juices was ultimately denied by the
USDA.
Similar state-level proposals have been made by Minnesota, Maine, Wisconsin,
and South Carolina although none has been granted by the USDA.3 At the national
level, an amendment sponsored by Senator Tom Coburn in 2013 to prohibit the use
of SNAP benefits to purchase junk food was not passed (Gundersen 2015). Without
a causal SNAP-obesity link, it is unclear whether any of these proposals restricting
consumption choices of SNAP participants will reduce the probability of being obese
among low-income households and may in effect lead to unintended consequences
such as increased stigma associated with participation and higher transaction and
program administration costs.
Non-random selection of people into the program complicates the estimation of
the causal impact of SNAP on obesity. Participants may differ in systematic ways
from income-eligible non-participants, making it difficult to obtain unbiased
estimates of SNAP’s effect on obesity. Such factors as current or expected future
health, human capital characteristics, time and risk preferences, preferences for food
and other health inputs, and attitudes toward work are simultaneously related to
SNAP participation and health outcomes (Currie 2003, Kreider et al. 2012).
3

Typical discussions about restructuring SNAP relates to the food and nutritional choices of
recipients. For instance, the Washington Post recently reported that the USDA has rejected for
the second time (after doing so in 2015) the state of Maine’s request to ban the purchase of sugar
sweetened beverages (soft drinks) and candy with SNAP benefits, at least to make the program antiobese (Dewey 2018). A recent NPR story discusses the Trump administration’s budget proposal for
fiscal year 2019 which aims to disburse SNAP benefits partly in the form of the so-called “USDA
Foods package.” (Hunzinger, Charles, Godoy & Aubrey 2018).
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SNAP participants are likely negatively selected into the program given that
participation is often associated with adverse nutrition-related health outcomes such
as worse diets and nutrition intake, obesity, or overweight compared to
non-recipients (Currie 2003, Hoynes & Schanzenbach 2016). Descriptive evidence
suggests that SNAP participants are less likely to consume appropriate amounts of
vitamins and minerals and are more likely to derive energy from solid fats, alcoholic
beverages, and added sugars relative to SNAP-eligible households who do not
participate in SNAP (Cole & Fox 2008). SNAP households also have lower scores on
the Healthy Eating index (HEI) 2005 than income-eligible nonparticipants and
income-ineligible nonparticipants (Cole & Fox 2008). Attempts have been made in
the literature to surmount this selection bias using instrumental variable (IV) and
panel data methods such as fixed effects and propensity score matching approaches.
Beyond addressing the endogeneity of participation, (non-classical) measurement
error arising due to the potential misreporting of SNAP status in national surveys
poses a considerable threat to causal identification. Misreporting is pervasive in
survey data and occurs when SNAP participants report receiving no benefits when
they actually did (false negatives) or vice versa (false positives). Meyer et al. (2009)
provide evidence of extensive under-reporting of program benefits of ten transfer
programs in five nationally representative surveys and reports that at least
one-third of SNAP benefits are not reported in survey data. Validation studies
confirm severe misreporting of program participation, sometimes up to almost 50%,
with the measurement error being possibly correlated with covariates (Meyer,
Goerge & Mittag 2015). Also, false negative reporting errors tend to be more
frequent than false positives, particularly with government programs.
Generally, misreporting of SNAP participation creates biases whose magnitude
and direction are not known without further assumptions (Bound, Brown &
Mathiowetz 2001, Kreider et al. 2012, Meyer & Mittag 2017, Nguimkeu et al. 2017).
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Even so, models that allow one to quantify and sign the resulting bias from a
misclassified binary variable are scarce while the few studies that take on the issue
of misclassification seriously usually assume that misreporting occurs randomly with
fixed or constant probability (Lewbel 2007).
This paper examines whether SNAP participation is linked to weight gain in
adults when we account for the typical case of false negative reporting errors. This
paper makes two contributions. First, using a novel approach developed in
Nguimkeu et al. (2017), this paper informs the longstanding policy discussions and
debates regarding the impacts of SNAP on recipient weight by addressing
endogenous participation and misreporting of benefit receipt. Second, the results
highlight the consequences of misreporting on estimated treatment effects in
empirical work by comparing our approach to standard estimators. I do not find
evidence that SNAP participation significantly increases weight for the full sample
or separately by gender. This finding departs from most previous studies suggesting
positive impacts of SNAP on adult weight outcomes, especially for females.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents background
information on SNAP. Section 3.3 discusses the related literature. Section 3.4
presents the data. Section 3.5 presents the methodology. Section 3.6 discusses the
results and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2
3.2.1

Background and Conceptual Framework
Brief Overview of SNAP

The Food Stamp Program has undergone numerous legislative changes from its
establishment under the Food Stamp Act of 1964, through the Food Stamp Act of
1977 (which eliminated the purchase requirement), to the Food, Conservation and
Energy Act of 2008 that changed the name of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 to the
Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 and renamed the Federal program the Supplemental
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Nutrition Assistance Program.4 SNAP is administered by the USDA with the
objective of increasing food security, reducing hunger, and improving health and
well-being of low-income individuals and households by expanding access to food,
nutritious diets, and nutrition education (Mabli, Ohls, Dragoset, Castner & Santos
2013). The Food Stamp Act of 2008 contains national eligibility standards
(categorical, financial and non-financial) as well as exceptions to the eligibility
criteria. Households are categorically eligible for SNAP if all members of the
household are receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or General Assistance (GA) in certain cases
(U.S. Department of Agriculture 2017). Households that are not categorically
eligible must meet two basic income eligibility standards – a gross income test and a
net income test.
The gross income tests requires households to have no more than 130 percent of
the federal poverty level while they must have net income (gross income less
allowable deductions) no more than the poverty level to pass the net income test.
Under current federal rules, the allowable deductions include such items as an
earned income deduction (currently set at 20 percent of earned income), a standard
deduction (based on household size), a dependent care deduction, qualified medical
expenses, child support deduction, and some excess shelter costs. Households must
also meet resource limits such as $2,250 in countable resources (e.g., cash).
Households with an elderly or disabled member only need to meet the net income
limit and can have up to $3,500 in countable resources.5 A household’s monthly
SNAP allotment is determined as the maximum allotment (based on household size)
less 30 percent of monthly net income.
4

The change of name presumably was an attempt to reduce the associated stigma with program
participation. Also, see Institute of Medicine and National Research Council (2013) for more detailed
discussion of SNAP’s historical milestones.
5
Households must also meet general work requirements such as not quitting or reducing hours
of work and must be U.S. citizens or lawfully present non-citizens.
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Between 2000 and 2014, the number of Americans receiving SNAP benefits has
almost tripled from about 17 million to 46 million while total spending on SNAP
has more than quadrupled from about $17 billion to almost $75 billion.6 This
translates to about one in seven Americans (or roughly 14% of the total U.S.
population) and monthly average benefits of $257 per household, or $125 per
person, or $4.11 per person per day in 2014.7
3.2.2

Can SNAP Participation Influence BMI?

Theoretically, the impact of SNAP on obesity is ambiguous. This section explores
two theoretical links between SNAP participation and obesity: neoclassical
economic theory and the “Food Stamp Cycle” hypothesis.
Neoclassical Theory
SNAP participation may affect obesity through its effect on consumption. Does
SNAP lead to greater food consumption that could increase the probability of
becoming obese? Following the standard Southworth model (Southworth 1945,
Bartfeld et al. 2015), individuals allocate total income (cash income plus SNAP
benefits) between food and a composite nonfood good. Since relative prices are
unchanged, SNAP benefits can be thought of as a pure income effect with a
predicted increase in consumption of all normal goods. In this standard framework,
the receipt of SNAP benefits merely loosens the budget constraint of participants
and affords greater consumption of food and nonfood goods as would any arbitrary
increase in disposable income or cash transfer.
However, due to the in-kind nature of SNAP, the Southworth model presented in
Figure 2.1 distinguishes between inframarginal or unconstrained participants and
6

SNAP statistics can be found at http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutritionassistance-program-snap. Part of this dramatic SNAP expansion is presumably due to the Great
Recession and this is a testament to the importance of SNAP in the social safety net in the U.S.
7
See Hoynes & Schanzenbach (2016) for a current review of SNAP and other nutrition assistance
programs in the U.S.
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extramarginal or constrained participants. Before the receipt of SNAP, the
individual chooses the mix of food and nonfood goods such that her utility is
maximized and her budget exhausted – point I1 in Figure 2.1. Upon receiving
SNAP benefits, the individual’s budget constraint shifts outward from AD to the
kinked budget constraint represented by BE2 D.8
Households are unconstrained or inframarginal if they receive less in SNAP
benefits than they would otherwise spend on food if their total income were solely
cash. From Figure 2.1, inframarginal households would choose the new consumption
bundle represented by I2 , consuming more of both food and nonfood goods.9 In this
scenario, we can draw on existing research on how changes in income affects obesity
to predict the impact of SNAP on obesity. Even so, existing research on the
relationship between income and weight (or obesity) is mixed and inconclusive (see,
for e.g., Cawley, Moran & Simon (2010), Schmeiser (2009), Lindahl (2005)).
Households are classified as extramarginal or constrained if they receive more in
SNAP benefits than they would otherwise have allocated for food if all their income
were cash. These consumers may have stronger preferences for relatively lower food
consumption and their consumption bundle before SNAP participation is
represented by point E1 in Figure 2.1. After receiving SNAP, the extramarginal
consumer spends only her SNAP benefits on food expenditures and chooses the
bundle denoted by point E2 (kink) in Figure 2.1. Such an individual is predicted to
spend proportionately more on food with SNAP than an equivalent cash transfer.
There is some evidence, possibly plagued by selection bias, that SNAP participants
with excess allowances tend to purchase more food than they otherwise would (Fox,
Hamilton & Lin 2004, Devaney & Moffitt 1991, Fraker, Martini & Ohls 1995).
Hoynes & Schanzenbach (2009) provides recent evidence that estimates of the
8

The triangle marked DE2 C represents consumption bundles that are attainable since SNAP
benefits are targeted or in-kind.
9
Consumption of food goes up by less than the full amount of SNAP benefits.
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marginal propensity (MPC) to consume food out of SNAP benefits is similar to the
MPC of cash income, albeit with dated data from the initial introduction of the
program between 1961 and 1975 across about 3000 U.S. counties.
Whether SNAP participants are inframarginal or extramarginal, the increased
spending on food can positively or negatively impact obesity depending on the mix
of “healthy" and “unhealthy" food purchased and consumed, which ultimately
depends on the preferences of households. If SNAP participants are selected from a
population with stronger preferences for “unhealthy" food, then one will expect
participants to have relatively greater consumption of “unhealthy" foods at all levels
of income, leading to weight gain. The converse also holds. Even given the same
preferences, the loosening of the budget constraint could lead to spending on goods
that increase (decrease) sedentary activities resulting in weight loss (gain).
Depending on the proportion of recipient households that are inframarginal versus
extramarginal and the types of food purchased, SNAP participation may or may not
have anything to do with obesity.
The Food Stamp Cycle Hypothesis
The Food Stamp Cycle describes the phenomenon where SNAP participants
unevenly use SNAP benefits and consume calories during the course of the month.
Wilde & Ranney (2000) and Shapiro (2005) present evidence that SNAP
participants’ food spending and food energy intake (calories) peaks sharply in the
first few days upon receipt of SNAP benefits and declines significantly with the
passage of time, suggesting that the timing of SNAP receipt may induce a
preference for immediate consumption. The Food Stamp Cycle thus leads to periods
of over-consumption (surpluses) and under-consumption (shortages) that is linked
to weight gain in both adults and children (Blackburn, Wilson, Kanders, Stein,
Lavin, Adler & Brownell 1989, Polivy, Zeitlin, Herman & Beal 1994, Dietz 1995).
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3.3

Related Literature and Misreporting of SNAP

Several papers examine the impact of SNAP on a host of outcomes, including
poverty, food insecurity, food consumption, and weight outcomes.10 In terms of
SNAP’s relationship with obesity, a common finding is that SNAP participation is
positively correlated with the probability of being obese or overweight (Townsend
et al. 2001, Gibson 2003, Chen et al. 2005, Baum 2011, Meyerhoefer & Pylypchuk
2008). For instance, Gibson (2003) uses an individual fixed effects estimator and
concludes that SNAP participation increases obesity among women but finds no
significant effects for men. Meyerhoefer & Pylypchuk (2008) adopts discrete factor
random effects and IV estimation approaches and comes to the same conclusion as
Gibson (2003).
A few researchers have found no statistically significant relationship between
SNAP participation and obesity (Fan 2010, Almada & Tchernis 2015). Using
propensity score matching methods, Fan (2010) finds no significant effect of SNAP
on obesity, overweight or BMI. Nonetheless, the consensus among policy makers is
that while SNAP participation does not increase or decrease probability of being
obese for children and non-elderly men, it tends to increase the probability of being
obese or overweight for non-elderly adult women (U.S. Department of Agriculture
2012).
Apart from the well-known selection bias in evaluating SNAP, the consequence
of the high and rising rates of misreported participation has not received sufficient
attention in this literature. Misreporting of SNAP participation in national surveys
has been well-documented with false negatives being more prevalent than false
positives. For instance, false negatives for SNAP are estimated to be around
20 − 30% in the 2001 and 2005 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), 35% in the 2001 American Community Survey (ACS) and up
10

For reviews, see Currie (2003), Bartfeld et al. (2015), and Hoynes & Schanzenbach (2016).
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to 50% in the 2002-2005 Annual Social and Economic Supplement (March CPS)
(Meyer, Goerge & Mittag 2015). Also, Mittag (2013) finds 26% false negatives in
the 2008-2010 ACS while Almada, McCarthy & Tchernis (2016) estimate 23 − 45%
false negative rates in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) - 1979
cohort.11 However, the corresponding false positive error rates are less than 1.5%
(Meyer, Goerge & Mittag 2015).
There is a growing literature suggesting that the estimated effect of a
misclassified binary explanatory variable may be substantially biased (Aigner 1973,
Bollinger & David 1997, Hausman et al. 1998, Black et al. 2000, Frazis &
Loewenstein 2003, Brachet 2008, Kreider 2010, Kreider et al. 2012, Nguimkeu et al.
2017). When a binary explanatory variable is misclassified, the measurement error
is necessarily nonclassical and without additional assumptions about the nature of
the measurement error, Gundersen & Kreider (2008) find wide bounds on the
resulting bias. This resulting bias persists even when misclassification is completely
random or exogenous. Examining the consequences of infrequent arbitrary errors in
a binary explanatory variable, Kreider (2010) finds that even with misclassification
error rates of 2%, the confidence intervals from the contaminated data that the
researcher observes and the true error-free data might not overlap.
Evidence from several papers including validation studies suggests that
misreporting may be correlated with individual and household characteristics.
Moreover, in their extensive review of measurement error in survey data, Bound
et al. (2001) discuss the possibility that the measurement error can be differential,
where measurement error depends on the outcomes of interest. For instance, in the
context of this paper, misreporting may be endogenous to the outcome if individuals
with higher body weight are more or less likely to report program receipt.
Methods for estimating the treatment effects of an endogenous and possibly
11

As in my paper, Almada et al. (2016) do not have access to administrative data as do the
previous two papers.

43

misreported binary regressor remains an active area of research. Obviously, the OLS
estimator inconsistent for the average treatment effect of SNAP participation and
may even assume a “wrong sign” in special cases (see for e.g., Hu, Shiu & Woutersen
(2015b) and Nguimkeu et al. (2017) for sign-reversal results). Traditional IV
methods have also been shown to be inconsistent (Black et al. 2000, Frazis &
Loewenstein 2003).12 Most existing methods for addressing misreporting in a
right-hand side binary variable have focused on the case of exogenous or random
misreporting. For instance, Frazis & Loewenstein (2003) provide a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator when instruments are available and provide
bounds when the misclassified variable is endogenous. Following Mahajan (2006),
Lewbel (2007) also considers the estimation of the treatment effect of a misclassified
binary regressor in nonparametric and semiparametric regression and achieves
identification using an “instrument-like” variable.13
Only a handful of papers have attempted to address both the endogeneity and
the misclassification of SNAP participation. Using partial identification methods to
bound the treatment effect of SNAP participation on child health outcomes, Kreider
et al. (2012) find that commonly cited relationships are misleading, concluding that
“under the weakest restrictions, there is substantial ambiguity; we cannot rule out
the possibility that SNAP increases or decreases poor health.” In the context of
adult weight, Almada et al. (2016) pursue various parametric and nonparametric
approaches to identify the effects of SNAP on the probability of being obese or
overweight. In addition to not finding any significant effects for SNAP’s effects on
the probability of being obese, Almada et al. (2016) caution that instrument-based
estimators are overstated and exceed nonparametric upper bounds (by over 200% in
12

For instance, Black et al. (2000) show that, under appropriate assumptions, the parameter
estimate of a mismeasured independent variable may be asymptotically bounded between the OLS
and IV estimators and provide a method-of-moments estimator for the case of binary or discrete
variables.
13
See Nguimkeu et al. (2017) for some evidence on the performance of Lewbel’s estimator
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certain cases) under reasonable assumptions of the treatment selection and
misreporting probabilities. When both participation and response error are allowed
to endogenous, this study employs the framework developed in Nguimkeu et al.
(2017) to consistently estimate the average treatment effect of SNAP on body
weight.
3.4

Data

This paper uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth - 1979 Cohort
(NLSY79), which is a nationally representative sample of 12,686 men and women
surveyed annually from 1979 and biennially after 1994. The NLSY79 is comprised of
three sub-samples: a cross-sectional sample of 6,111 respondents representing the
non-institutionalized population, a supplemental sample of 5,295 civilian Hispanic
or Latino, black, and economically disadvantaged non-black/non-Hispanic
population, and a sample of 1,280 military youth. The analysis sample is limited to
the 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 waves in part due to the availability of
state-level policy variables from the SNAP Policy Database, which are used to
instrument SNAP participation (U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 2016).14
The respondents were between 14 and 22 years old in 1979, thus, the ages of the
respondents in the analysis sample range from 31 to 39 years.
The dependent variable of interest is respondents’ body weight as measured by
BMI, which is constructed from the self-reports of weight and height. I restrict the
sample to observations with non-missing values of weight and height biennially from
1996 to 2004.15
14

The Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA maintains the SNAP Policy Database
which contains state-level SNAP policy choices for all 50 states and the District of Columbia from
1996 to 2011 as of October, 2016.
15
Weight is reported in pounds in the survey years 1981, 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990,
1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. However, height in
inches is only reported in 1981, 1982, and 1985. Following the prior literature, I use height in 1985
to calculate each respondent’s BMI as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.
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The treatment indicator of interest is a dummy that equals 1 for SNAP
participation in at least one month of the past calendar year and zero otherwise. In
the final analysis sample, 16.26% of the survey respondents reported SNAP
participation in at least one month of the previous calendar year. Out of this
reported participation, about 72.36% participated during every month of the year.
It is a more complicated process to determine which respondents are eligible in the
NLSY79 and almost any other nationally representative survey because of the
inadequacy of the income and asset data required for such an exercise. As
previously mentioned, individuals must meet gross income, net income, and asset
tests. Although these criteria are determined at the federal level, many exceptions
exist and individual states can make exemptions in certain cases.
As a result, the majority of studies have resorted to checking whether a
household’s income (after adjusting for household size) meets a particular multiple
of the federal poverty line. While some studies use the gross income cutoff of 130%
of the federal poverty line to determine SNAP eligibility, other studies have used
higher thresholds of up to 250% of the federal poverty line. Using just the gross
income test to determine eligibility can result in comparisons with individuals that
are not truly eligible for SNAP. Also, since eligibility is based on monthly gross and
net income, using a more restrictive threshold might miss those who become eligible
for only certain portions of the year (Mykerezi & Mills 2010, Almada et al. 2016).
Thus, I restrict the final analysis sample to respondents at or less than 250% of the
federal poverty level who are observed in at least two waves from 1996 to 2004.
Doing so captures about 96% of reported SNAP participation.
The NLSY79 permits the construction of demographic variables such as race,
gender, and marital status. It also contains information on household characteristics
such as the age of household members, household size, family income, information
on labor market activities, and educational attainment of respondents and their
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mothers. Educational attainments for respondents and their mothers are measured
by dummies for completing of high school or more. Labor market activity is
captured by weekly hours worked in the past calendar year as well as current
employment status. Also, the NLSY79 collects post-interview information from
interviewers include demographic characteristics and other remarks about the
interview process such as the respondents’ general attitude and the presence of third
parties during the interview. Section 3.5 discusses how I exploit these additional
interview and interviewer characteristics in the estimation strategy.
The final data set consists of 2,798 persons and 8,502 person-year observations.
Table 3.1 reports the means and standard deviations of the variables used in the
regressions for the full sample and by participation status. The average BMI for
SNAP participants is 29.39 while it is 27.94 for nonparticipants. The summary
statistics indicate that SNAP participants are negatively selected on a variety of
observable dimensions. For instance, SNAP recipients belong to households with
lower family incomes ($15,147.11 vs. $24,522.59), work for fewer average weekly
hours (20.67 vs. 34.38), have slightly larger household sizes (3.70 vs. 3.43) with
more children (2.07 vs. 1.69), are less likely to be married (0.25 vs. 0.47), are less
likely to have a high school diploma or higher (0.72 vs. 0.84), are more likely to
have mothers have graduated from high school (0.41 vs. 0.52), and are more likely
to participate in WIC (0.21 vs. 0.06) relative to nonparticipants.
3.5

Methodology

The objective of this study is to estimate the average treatment effect of SNAP
participation on BMI, accounting for selection bias and possible (endogenous)
misreporting of participation. As previously discussed, self-selection into SNAP
along unobservable dimensions as well as the possible misclassification of
participation status renders a naive regression of weight status on the binary
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participation indicator an inconsistent estimator for the average treatment effect of
interest. In fact, although standard linear IV estimators may address the
self-selection problem, they are inconsistent for the treatment effect in light of the
nonclassical nature of misreported participation.
In the remainder of this section, I present the econometric framework, developed
in Nguimkeu et al. (2017), which addresses these problems by simultaneously
modeling SNAP participation and misreporting decisions in relation to the evolution
of BMI. For concreteness, we are interested in the causal effect of participating in
SNAP on BMI in the linear treatment effects model

yit = x0it β + Tit∗ α + it ,

(3.1)

where yit is BMI for individual i at time t, Tit∗ is individual i’s true unobserved (to
the researcher) SNAP participation status in year t, xit is a vector of observed
characteristics, β is a k-parameter vector, and it , is the error term. Our interest lies
in estimating the treatment effect denoted by α.
In the empirical analyses, xit includes demographic characteristics such as
respondent’s age, race, gender, marital status. It also includes family characteristics
such as household size, number of children, logarithm of income and human capital
characteristics such as educational attainment and mother’s education. Other
variables included in xit are labor market activity measured by average weekly
hours worked in past calendar year and current employment status as well as
indicators for living in an urban area, receiving WIC benefits, AFDC/TANF
receipt, SSI receipt, and indicators for having an infant (≤5 years) and an elderly
person (≥ 65 years) living in the home.
To address self-selection into the program, an individual’s true SNAP
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participation decision is modeled following the usual latent utility formulation as

0
θ + vit ≥ 0) ,
Tit∗ = 1 (zit

(3.2)

where zit is a vector of observed covariates related to the decision to participate in
SNAP, θ is a q-parameter vector, and vit is the error term. The endogeneity of true
participation arises due to the self-selection mechanism in equation (3.2) and the
correlation of the error terms in equations (3.1) and (3.2).
In equation (3.2), zit includes xit in addition an exclusion restriction, namely,
the percentage of SNAP benefits issued by the state via electronic benefit (EBT)
cards. Theoretically, this state-level exclusion restriction should affect the
probability of take-up but should not directly influence BMI in equation (3.1) or the
propensity to misreport in equation (3.3) below. The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of August 22, 1996 (PRWORA) mandated all
states to implement EBT systems by the year 2002 which allows recipients to
authorize their SNAP benefits to be electronically transferred unto their EBT
accounts monthly.16 The number of states implementing EBT systems grew from 15
in 1996, 37 in 1998, 42 in 2000, 49 in 2002, to all states by 2004.17 Figure 3.3
presents the distribution of the percentage of benefits issued via EBT card for the
sample period across the U.S., depicting variation across both state and time.
There are at least two ways in which the percentage of benefits issued via EBT
card can influence participation without directly influencing BMI. First, states that
mail benefits by direct mail (as opposed to using EBT cards), increase the costs
16

Other major changes that came along with PRWORA included removing eligibility for most
legal immigrants, limiting benefit receipt to 3 out of 36 months for individuals classified as ablebodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs), and setting the maximum allotments at 100 percent
of the change in the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP). A complete description of the changes effected by
PRWORA can be found at https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap.
17
Also, I initially used other state-level policies such as whether the state requires biometric
identification, whether the state operates a call center, and the proportion of SNAP units with
and without earnings with 1-3 month re-certification periods. None of these policies significantly
predicted participation in this sample.
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associated with participation. Supposedly, receiving benefits via an EBT card is less
burdensome and can make it easier for the marginal individual to take up SNAP.
Second, households in states that issue a higher percentage of benefits via EBT
cards may be more likely to take up SNAP because of the (perceived) lower costs of
participation resulting from reduced stigma associated with using benefits via EBT
cards (which function just like regular debit cards) as opposed to coupons (Currie
2003, Wright, Tekin, Topalli, McClellan, Dickinson & Rosenfeld 2017).
Since true SNAP participation, Tit∗ , is unobserved (due to possible misreporting),
the researcher observes a surrogate, Tit that is generated as
Tit = Tit∗ × Rit ,

(3.3)

where Rit is a reporting dummy variable characterized by
0
Rit = 1 (wit
γ + uit ≥ 0) ,

(3.4)

where wit is a vector of observed covariates related to the decision to correctly (or
incorrectly) report program participation, γ is a p-parameter vector, and ui is the
error term. Again, the endogeneity of misreporting arises because of the mechanism
described by equation (3.4) and the fact that the error terms in equations (3.1) and
(3.4) are allowed to be correlated.
Equations (3.2) and (3.4) together form a complete model of SNAP participation
and reporting although Tit and Rit are unobserved. It is obvious from the
observation mechanism in equation (3.3) that misreporting captures only false
negatives since an individual correctly reports participation only if Ri = 1
(conditional on true participation) and reports non-participation otherwise.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the partial observability of participation inherent in
equation (3.3). If we suppose that we have a random sample of eligible participants,
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then Figure 3.2 shows two levels of data observability. In Level 1, the data is split
into two distinct classes, namely true participants and true nonparticipants. Level 1
is not observable to the researcher but only the individual respondent. Level 2
describes the observed data which are split into two cases, A and B. Case A
consists of two observationally indistinguishable cases, namely, true reports of
nonparticipation and false reports of nonparticipation (false negatives). These two
scenarios under Case A are observationally equivalent because the researcher only
observed Tit = 0 in both instances. In the second case denoted by B in Figure 3.2,
true participants (correctly) report participation. These distinct groups of
observations (A and B) motivate the maximum likelihood estimation of the partial
observability model described in equations (3.3) and (3.4).
In equation (3.4), wit includes xit and additional regressors that are
hypothesized to be associated with one’s probability of accurately reporting
participation. These extra covariates will be excluded from equation (3.2) but need
not be excluded from the outcome equation. The exclusion restrictions in equations
(3.2) and (3.4) come from different data sources. I use a set of interview and
interviewer characteristics available in the NLSY79 as additional predictors of the
misreporting mechanism.18
As previously mentioned, the NLSY79 interviewers participate in a survey after
the interview process where information is collected on their perceptions regarding
the interview process and their interaction with interviewees such as the
respondent’s general attitude during the interview and whether a third party was
present with the primary respondent during the interview. I use indicators for the
interview mode, indicators of the respondent’s attitude during the interview based
on the interviewer’s remarks in the post-interview survey as well as the gender and
race of the interviewer as the excluded predictors of misreporting in equation (3.4).
18

Although the covariates zi and wi may overlap, it is required that they be different in general,
at least to avoid the local identification problems discussed in Poirier (1980).
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Collectively, these variables are in the spirit of the “cooperativeness hypothesis” in
Bollinger & David (2001) who find favorable evidence for the hypothesis that
respondents with high propensity to cooperate with the survey are more likely to
truthfully report their participation. For example, respondents who are impatient,
restless, or hostile during the interview are less cooperative with the survey and are
more likely to respond incorrectly. I expect these characteristics to be strongly
associated with the probability to misreport participation but should not affect
one’s participation decision or the evolution of body weight.
3.5.1

Estimation Procedure

The estimation of the model presented above proceeds in two steps. The first stage
is estimated as a partial observability model following Poirier (1980), which is
followed by ordinary least squares regression in the second stage (regression with a
proxy variable). Notice that, from equations (3.3) and (3.4), we can write the
double-index model for observed participation, Tit , as
0
0
Tit = Tit∗ × Rit = 1 (zit
θ + vit ≥ 0, wit
γ + uit ≥ 0) .

(3.5)

If we denote the joint cumulative density function (CDF) of (−u, −v) by

F (u, v, ρ) = Pr[−ui ≤ u, −vi ≤ v],

for any − ∞ < u, v < +∞,

(3.6)

then the parameters θ (equation (3.2)), γ (equation (3.4)), and ρ (the correlation
between u and v) may be consistently estimated in the first stage. I estimate the
following binary choice model by maximum likelihood:

0
0
0
0
Pr[Tit = 1|wit , zit ] = Pr [−uit ≤ wit
γ, −vit ≤ zit
θ] = F (wit
γ, zit
θ, ρ) = Pi (γ, θ, ρ),

(3.7)
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where the log-likelihood function of the model is given by

Ln (γ, θ, ρ) =

n
X

Ti ln Pi (γ, θ, ρ) + (1 − Ti ) ln (1 − Pi (γ, θ, ρ)) .

i=1

In the second step, each person’s predicted probability of true participation, T̂it∗ , is
0
obtained as T̂it∗ = Φ(zit
θ̂) using the estimates of θ from the first stage. The predicted

values, T̂it∗ , which are free from self-selection and non-classical measurement error
are substituted for Tit∗ in the outcome equation in the new model given by
yit = x0it β + T̂it∗ α2S + ηit ,

(3.8)

where α2S denotes the average treatment effect of SNAP on BMI and ηi is the
associated disturbance term. It can be shown that the above two-step procedure is a
consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of the treatment effect of interest
(Nguimkeu et al. 2017).
3.6

Results and Discussion

I present estimates from the first step estimation of the partial observability model
in equation (3.5) followed by the second step results from equation (3.8). Before
turning to the regression results, one may be interested in the estimated false
negative rate using the first stage estimates from equation (3.7). Given the
one-sided nature of the the econometric framework I adopt in this paper, it can be
shown that the false negative rate for each person is given by

P (Ti = 0 | Ti∗ = 1) = 1 −

P (Ri = 1, Ti∗ = 1)
=1−
P (Ti∗ = 1)
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0
0
F wit γ̂, zit θ̂, ρ̂
0
Φ(zit
θ̂)

,

(3.9)

where F (., ., .) and Φ(.) respectively denote the joint bivariate and univariate
normal CDFs, and the hats denote parameter estimates from the first stage
estimation of the binary choice model in equation (3.7). Thus, averaging the
quantity in equation (3.9) yields a consistent estimate of the population false
negative rate. The estimated false negative rates are 20.72 percent for the full
sample, 8.67 percent for females, and 54.18 percent for males. These estimated false
negative rates are similar to those obtained in Almada et al. (2016).
3.6.1

First Stage Estimation

Table 3.2 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the
excluded regressors in the true participation and reporting equations. Panels A and
B in Table 3.2 correspond with equations (3.2) and (3.4), respectively.
As discussed in Section 3.5, two sets of covariates need to be distinguished: (a)
instruments for true participation (zit ), and (b) predictors of misreporting (wit ).
Although these sets of covariates may overlap, they must be different for
identification purposes. In other words, at least one excluded variable (exclusion
restriction) in either the participation or reporting equation suffices for
identification. All regressions also include the additional covariates from the
outcome equation.
As previously mentioned, the state-level policy variable that is used to
instrument for true participation is the percentage of SNAP benefits issued by the
state via EBT cards. Panel A in Table 3.2 shows that the percentage of SNAP
benefits issued by the state via electronic benefit (EBT) cards is positive and
statistically significantly correlated with the true participation probability for for
the full sample and by gender. The wald test of excluded instrument also suggests
that EBT card benefit issuance is a strong predictor of participation.
Panel B in Table 3.2 presents coefficient estimates of the excluded predictors of
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misreporting in the reporting equation (3.4). I rely on the NLSY79 interview and
interviewer characteristics as excluded covariates driving the reporting process. It is
noteworthy that these covariates only need to be excluded from the true
participation equation but not the outcome equation. The set of excluded predictors
describing the reporting mechanism are interview mode, descriptors for respondents’
attitude during the interview, gender of the interviewer, and race of the interviewer.
I expect these covariates to influence one’s probability of misreporting participation
without affecting the probability of participation.
The interview mode is a categorical variable with three levels describing features
of the interview process. The three levels are: 1=in-person and alone, 2=in-person
with third party present, and 3=phone interview. The excluded category in the
regressions is level 1 (in-person and alone). Also, the NLSY79 interviewers were
surveyed after each interview and asked to indicate their perception of the
respondent’s attitude during the interview. Responses were grouped on a
three-point scale: 1=Friendly and interested, 2=Cooperative but not particularly
interested, and 3=Impatient, restless, or hostile. This attitude variable is included
as a set of dummy variables in the regressions with the excluded category being level
1 (Friendly and interested). I include a dummy variable for whether the interviewee
and the interviewer are of the same gender, whether the interviewee and the
interviewer are of the same race, and an interaction of these two dummy variables.
Due to a lack of a general theory of misreporting, I do not have strong a priori
expectations about the directions of the effects of these interview and interviewer
characteristics. Nonetheless, one can draw on a related literature studying the
relationship between the probability of misreporting in surveys and both interview
and interviewer characteristics for insights in discussing the results (e.g.,
Bruckmeier, Müller & Riphahn (2015), O’Muircheartaigh & Campanelli (1998),
Schober & Conrad (1997), Suchman & Jordan (1990)).
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The estimates in Panel B of Table 3.2 suggest that the interview, interviewee,
and interviewer characteristics are correlated with the probability of true
participation in equation (3.4). A large body of literature has considered
measurement error in survey responses to sensitive questions, especially when the
answers may be stigmatized or not viewed as socially desirable. For instance,
Tourangeau & Yan (2007) report substantial error in responses to sensitive
questions and also notes that such inaccurate responses vary significantly with the
mode of administering the survey. I find that having an adult present during the
interview is positively associated with the probability of truthfully reporting
participation status, relative to being interviewed alone in person, although not
statistically significant for females (see Table 3.2). This finding is similar to
Bruckmeier et al. (2015) who find that survey respondents are more likely to give
truthful answers on welfare receipt when a third person is present. However, I do
not find statistically significant association between being in a phone interview
relative to being interviewed alone in person.
Bollinger & David (1997, 2001) discuss the so-called “cooperator hypothesis”
where survey respondents may or may not cooperate with the survey in terms of
giving accurate responses. They provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that
cooperators have a tendency to give more accurate responses (Bollinger & David
2001, 2005). I find evidence that the respondent’s attitude during the interview is
associated with the probability of truthfully reporting participation. The results
suggest that interviewees who are impatient, restless or hostile during the interview
are less likely to truthfully report participation and this association is statistically
significant for the full and male samples. For females, respondents who are not
interested are less likely to report participation truthfully.
Finally, a related literature studies how interviewers (for e.g., interviewer
demographic characteristics) affects the accuracy of survey responses. One might
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expect interviewers’ gender and race to affect survey responses when respondents
know or can perceive the demography of the interviewer.19 I include three variables
controlling for interviewer effects: a same-gender indicator variable that takes on 1 if
both respondent and interviewer are of the same sex and 0 otherwise, a same-race
indicator variable that assumes 1 if both respondent and interviewer are of the same
race (i.e., either black, hispanic, or non-black/non-hispanic) and 0 otherwise, and an
interaction of these two dummy variables. From Table 3.2, I find that, for females,
being interviewed by someone of the same sex is negatively correlated with the
propensity of truthfully reporting participation and this effect varies statistically
significantly by race. I do not find statistically significant effects of such gender and
race combinations for the full and male samples.
Overall, the results from the first stage of the two-step estimator used in this
paper suggest that the instruments for true participation and predictors of
participation are strongly correlated with the observed, reported SNAP
participation.
3.6.2

Second Stage Estimation

Table 3.3 reports the estimated average treatment effect of SNAP participation on
BMI using the two-step estimator in equation (3.8). I do not find a statistically
significant effect of SNAP participation on BMI for the full sample or by gender.
The estimated treatment effect of SNAP participation on BMI for females of -1.973
implies a weight loss of approximately 12 pounds, albeit not statistically
significant.20 For the full and male samples, the estimated coefficients are also
statistically insignificant and imply a weight gain of about 3 pounds and 7.7
pounds, respectively.

19

See Weisberg (2009) for a more detailed review of the literature on interviewer effects in surveys.
The mean height in the final data set is 65.75 inches, suggesting that relative to the average
height, a one BMI unit change translates into a weight change of 6.12 pounds.
20
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For the purposes of comparison with the two-step estimator, Table 3.3 also
presents estimates of SNAP’s effect on BMI using ordinary least squares (OLS) and
standard instrumental variable (IV) estimators. The OLS estimates of SNAP’s
effects are positive and statistically significant, with participation being associated
with an increase in weight of about 5.1 pounds and 4.8 pounds for the full sample
and females, respectively. The coefficient estimate is slightly smaller in magnitude
for males but is not statistically significant. Obviously, the OLS estimator is biased
and inconsistent due to both self-selection and possible misreporting of participation
and the direction of bias aligns with SNAP participants being negatively selected.
The IV estimator uses the same instrument for participation (i.e., the percentage
of SNAP benefits issued by the state via electronic benefit cards) as the two-step
estimator adopted in this paper. The first stage results for the IV estimator are
summarized in Table 3.4, showing high and statistically significant F-statistics.
From Table 3.3, the IV estimates are negative and statistically insignificant but with
magnitudes implying weight reductions of about 7.2 pounds for females and notably
implausible weight reductions of almost 100 pounds for males (see Table 3.3). The
IV results for males partly highlights the sensitivity of IV methods that do not
account for misreporting process directly.
Robustness Checks
Since the self-reported height and weight in the NLSY can be misreported as well, I
re-estimate the models adjusting for BMI using predicted height and weight using
data from the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES
III) following Courtemanche, Pinkston & Stewart (2015). Using the NHANES III as
a validation data set, I regress actual weight and height on the cubic basis splines of
the percentile rank of the respective reported measures as well as a polynomial in
age by race and gender. Thereafter, I predict weight and height in my NLSY sample
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using the estimated relationship between actual and reported measures in the
NHANES III data, which are then used to calculate an adjusted BMI measure as
usual. The results using the adjusted BMI measure are reported in Table 3.5 and
are very similar to using the reported NLSY values.
As previously mentioned, qualifying for SNAP is based on financial,
non-financial and categorical eligibility rules. I initially restricted the analysis
sample to respondents below 250% of the federal poverty line since the literature
recognizes that the federal gross income eligibility threshold of 130% is too
restrictive (Mykerezi & Mills 2010, Almada et al. 2016). However, I re-estimated the
model with the sample restricted to 185% and 130% of the federal poverty level for
the full sample and females.21 Table 3.6 presents the results for these alternative
eligibility criteria (as well as the initial 250% FPL threshold for comparison) and
shows that the pattern of results is unchanged in terms of statistical significance.
For the full sample, the magnitudes of the estimated impacts of SNAP on BMI
suggests (statistically insignificant) weight gains of 7.9 pounds and 6.6 pounds for
the 185%-FPL and 130%-FPL samples, respectively. The estimated effect of SNAP
on BMI remains negative and statistically insignificant for females, with magnitudes
indicating smaller weight reductions of about 8.3 pounds and 2.6 pounds for 185%
and 130% of the federal poverty level, respectively.
My results suggest no statistically significant effect of SNAP on BMI for the full
sample and also by gender when we account for both the endogeneity and possible
misreporting of participation in one unifying framework. The two-step estimates
also suggest that the estimated average treatment effect of SNAP is not bounded
between the OLS and IV estimates as has been suggested elsewhere when
misreporting is exogenous.
Moreover, the findings of this paper depart from previous studies suggesting
21

Due to non-convergence, results are not reported for the male sample using these alternative
eligibility criteria.
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positive associations between SNAP participation and obesity, especially for females
(Townsend et al. 2001, Gibson 2003, Chen et al. 2005, Kaushal 2007, Meyerhoefer &
Pylypchuk 2008, Baum 2011). For instance, Chen et al. (2005) find that SNAP
participation is associated with an increase of 3.61 BMI units, implying a weight
increase of almost 22 pounds. In particular, although not statistically significant, I
find a reduction in BMI for females that is linked to SNAP participation. Thus, the
estimated coefficients in this study do not support the hypothesis that SNAP
participation associated with obesity.
3.7

Conclusion

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program remains the largest nutrition
assistance program in the United States and currently influences the diets of about
1 in 7 Americans. The existing literature which mostly finds a positive impact of
SNAP on the probability of being obese, especially for females, has inadequately
addressed the problem of high misreporting rates in reported participation in
national surveys. Not only is SNAP participation subject to severe misreporting but
such measurement error may be endogenous. Although the prevalence of
misreporting is not new, few researchers have examined its consequences for
estimating the impacts of SNAP. This paper estimates the casual effect of SNAP on
adult body weight in the presence of endogenous misreporting using a novel
identification strategy that explicitly addresses both the endogeneity of
participation and the systematic nature of misreporting (Nguimkeu et al. 2017). In
contrast to most previous studies, I find that SNAP participation is associated with
reductions of approximately 2 BMI units (about 7% on average) for females but
these changes are not statistically different from zero.
The econometric framework models the evolution of body weight, true
participation, and the misreporting mechanism jointly. The first equation is the
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usual treatment effects model relating BMI to an unobserved SNAP participation
indicator and other contributing factors. To address selection bias, the second
equation models true SNAP participation as a function of observed covariates such
as those in the outcome equation and exclusion restrictions. Finally, the third
equation describes an individual’s probability to misreport her true SNAP
participation status as a function of observed covariates including demographic and
survey/interviewer characteristics.
I use predicted probabilities of true participation from a first stage estimation
which are free from self-selection and measurement error to estimate the causal
effect of SNAP participation on BMI. In addition to functional form assumptions, I
employ exclusion restrictions for participation and predictors of misreporting such
as survey and interviewer characteristics to strengthen identification. I do not find
evidence of a statistically significant effect of SNAP on weight status for females
with the estimated effect suggesting reductions in BMI. Even when SNAP
participation is positively associated with BMI such as for males and the full
sample, the magnitude of the effects is not large enough to cause people of normal
weight to become obese.
This study has a few limitations. This study focused on false negative reporting
errors which are the more prevalent case of reporting errors. Future work should
address bidirectional reporting error. As pointed out by other researchers, there are
more accurate measures of fatness besides BMI used in this study (Burkhauser &
Cawley 2008).
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Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.1: Neoclassical framework for analyzing impact of SNAP on consumption
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Figure 3.2: First Stage (Partial Observability Model)
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of the percentage of SNAP benefits issued by
the state via electronic benefit (EBT) cards (by year)
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by SNAP Participation Status
Body Mass Index
Age
Female
Hispanic
Black
Household Size
Married
Mother’s education (High school graduate or higher)
High school graduate or higher
Number of children
Household with child (< 5 years)
Lives in Urban Area
WIC
SSI
AFDC/TANF
Household in poverty
Average Weekly Hours worked (Past Calendar Year)
Household with elderly (> 65 years)
Employed
Total Net Family Income (2004 dollars)
Observations

Full Sample
28.13
(0.17)
38.71
(0.08)
0.58
(0.01)
0.09
(0.01)
0.23
(0.03)
3.46
(0.05)
0.44
(0.02)
0.51
(0.02)
0.82
(0.01)
1.74
(0.05)
0.17
(0.01)
0.66
(0.03)
0.08
(0.00)
0.09
(0.01)
0.07
(0.01)
0.31
(0.01)
32.55
(0.50)
0.07
(0.01)
0.83
(0.01)
23,267.58
(484.88)
8502

Nonparticipants
27.94
(0.16)
38.79
(0.08)
0.55
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)
0.21
(0.03)
3.43
(0.06)
0.47
(0.02)
0.52
(0.02)
0.84
(0.01)
1.69
(0.05)
0.17
(0.01)
0.66
(0.03)
0.06
(0.00)
0.06
(0.01)
0.01
(0.00)
0.26
(0.01)
34.38
(0.51)
0.07
(0.01)
0.86
(0.01)
24,522.59
(518.98)
7120

Participants
29.39
(0.42)
38.21
(0.19)
0.75
(0.02)
0.11
(0.02)
0.35
(0.04)
3.70
(0.08)
0.25
(0.02)
0.41
(0.03)
0.72
(0.02)
2.07
(0.08)
0.22
(0.02)
0.70
(0.03)
0.21
(0.02)
0.27
(0.02)
0.40
(0.03)
0.65
(0.02)
20.67
(0.92)
0.05
(0.01)
0.65
(0.02)
15,147.11
(446.10)
1382

Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for the complex design survey design of the NLSY79. Based on the 1996-2004
biennial waves of the NLSY79, restricted to individuals or households with income lower than 250% of the federal poverty
line.
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Table 3.2: Partial Observability Probit Model of Observed Participation
Panel A: True Participation Equation
Percentage of Benefits issued via EBT Card
Observations
Wald Test of Excluded Instruments p-value
Panel B: True Reporting Equation
Interview Mode Dummies
Any Adult Present During Interview
Phone Interview
Respondent’s Attitude Dummies
Not Interested But Cooperative
Impatient/Restless/Hostile
Interviewer Characteristics
Same Gender Dummy (Interviewer & Interviewee)
Same Race Dummy (Interviewer & Interviewee)
Interaction of Same-gender &
Same-race Dummy (Interviewer & Interviewee)
Observations
Wald Test of Excluded Instruments p-value

Full Sample

Female

Male

0.452***
(0.088)
8502
0.000

0.467***
(0.108)
5036
0.000

0.451***
(0.173)
3466
0.009

0.166
(0.176)
-0.152
(0.166)

0.073
(0.140)
-0.203
(0.137)

0.597**
(0.255)
-0.0437
(0.186)

-0.330
(0.213)
-0.485**
(0.216)

-0.345***
(0.129)
-0.128
(0.238)

-0.188
(0.234)
-1.053**
(0.433)

-0.093
(0.280)
-0.233
(0.257)

-1.128**
(0.497)
-1.065*
(0.579)

0.419
(0.358)
-0.281
(0.231)

-0.007
(0.240)
8502
0.056

1.049*
(0.582)
5036
0.0287

-0.413
(0.503)
3466
0.110

Standard errors in parentheses. Results are based on the 1996-2004 biennial waves of the NLSY79, restricted
to individuals or households with income below 250% of the federal poverty line. The excluded category
for the interview mode dummies is “In person (alone)” and that for the respondent attitude dummies is
“Friendly and Interested.” Regressors not reported in here include respondent’s age, race, household size,
number of children, weekly hours worked in the past calendar year, current employment status, educational
attainment, mother’s education, marital status, log of income, time fixed effects, and indicators for living
in an urban area, receiving WIC benefits, receiving AFDC/TANF, receiving SSI benefits, and indicators for
having an infant (≤5 years) and an elderly person (≥ 65 years) living in the home.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
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Table 3.3: Effects of SNAP participation on BMI
Dependent Variable: BMI
Estimator
OLS
IV
Full Sample
SNAP Participation
Observations
Female Sample
SNAP Participation
Observations
Male Sample
SNAP Participation
Observations

2S

0.835***
(0.334)
8502

-6.040
(5.856)
8502

0.490
(1.498)
8502

0.794*
(0.428)
5036

-1.180
(7.782)
5036

-1.973
(1.632)
5036

0.649
(0.510)
3466

-16.261
(9.831)
3466

1.265
(1.531)
3466

Standard errors in parentheses and are bootstrapped (200
replications) for the two-step (2S) estimation. Results are
based on the 1996-2004 biennial waves of the NLSY79, restricted to individuals or households with income lower than
250% of the federal poverty line. Regressors not reported in
here include respondent’s age, race, gender, household size,
number of children, weekly hours worked in the past calendar year, current employment status, educational attainment,
mother’s education, marital status, log of income, time fixed
effects, and indicators for living in an urban area, receiving
WIC benefits, receiving AFDC/TANF, receiving SSI benefits,
and indicators for having an infant (≤5 years) and an elderly
person (≥ 65 years) living in the home.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
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Table 3.4: First Stage IV Estimates
Dependent Variable: SNAP Participation
Full Sample Female
Percentage of Benefits issued via EBT Card
0.046***
0.048***
(0.009)
(0.014)
F- statistics
22.54***
11.93***
Observations
8502
5036

Male
0.0425***
(0.013)
10.73***
3466

Standard errors in parentheses. Results are based on the 1996-2004 biennial waves of the NLSY79,
restricted to individuals or households with income lower than 250% of the federal poverty line.
Regressors not reported in here include respondent’s age, race, gender, household size, number of
children, weekly hours worked in the past calendar year, current employment status, educational
attainment, mother’s education, marital status, log of income, time fixed effects, and indicators for
living in an urban area, receiving WIC benefits (female-only regressions), receiving AFDC/TANF,
receiving SSI benefits, and indicators for having an infant (≤5 years) and an elderly person (≥ 65
years) living in the home.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
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Table 3.5: Effects of SNAP on Adjusted BMI
Dependent Variable: Adjusted BMI
Estimator
OLS
IV
2S
Full Sample
SNAP Participation 0.804*** -5.499
0.460
(0.307) (5.168) (1.387)
Observations
8502
8502
8502
Female Sample
SNAP Participation 0.694*
-0.845 -1.818
(0.384) (6.643) (1.697)
Observations
5036
5036
5036
Male Sample
SNAP Participation
0.648
-16.261 1.264
(0.510) (9.831) (1.575)
Observations
3466
3466
3466
Standard errors in parentheses and are bootstrapped (200
replications) for the two-step (2S) estimation. Results are
based on the 1996-2004 biennial waves of the NLSY79, restricted to individuals or households with income lower than
250% of the federal poverty line. Additionally, BMI is calculated from predicted height and weight as described in the text
following Courtemanche et al. (2015). Regressors not reported
in here include respondent’s age, race, gender, household size,
number of children, weekly hours worked in the past calendar year, current employment status, educational attainment,
mother’s education, marital status, log of income, time fixed
effects, and indicators for living in an urban area, receiving
WIC benefits, receiving AFDC/TANF, receiving SSI benefits,
and indicators for having an infant (≤5 years) and an elderly
person (≥ 65 years) living in the home.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
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Table 3.6: Effects of SNAP on BMI with Alternative Eligibility
Full Sample
OLS
IV
250% FPL
SNAP Participation
Observations
185% FPL
SNAP Participation
Observations
130% FPL
SNAP Participation
Observations

2S

OLS

Females
IV

0.835*** -6.040
(0.334) (5.856)
8502
8502

0.490
(1.498)
8502

0.794*
(0.428)
5,036

-1.180
(7.782)
5,036

-1.973
(1.632)
5,036

0.878**
(0.358)
5758

-4.272
(5.597)
5758

1.299
(1.550)
5758

0.851*
(0.450)
3,554

-3.237
(6.887)
3,554

-1.354
(1.756)
3,554

0.972**
(0.419)
3607

1.366
(5.707)
3607

1.086
(1.648)
3607

0.868*
(0.521)
2,313

-2.241
(6.590)
2,313

-0.435
(2.289)
2,313

2S

Standard errors in parentheses and are bootstrapped (200 replications) for the two-step (2S)
estimation. Results are based on the 1996-2004 biennial waves of the NLSY79, restricted to
individuals or households with income lower than 250%, 185%, and 130% of the federal poverty
line. Regressors not reported in here include respondent’s age, race, gender, household size,
number of children, weekly hours worked in the past calendar year, current employment status,
educational attainment, mother’s education, marital status, log of income, time fixed effects,
and indicators for living in an urban area, receiving WIC benefits, receiving AFDC/TANF,
receiving SSI benefits, and indicators for having an infant (≤5 years) and an elderly person
(≥ 65 years) living in the home.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.010
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CHAPTER 4

Estimating the Associations between SNAP and Food Insecurity,
Obesity, and Food Purchases with Imperfect Administrative Measures of
Participation

4.1

Introduction

A growing literature documents the problems with relying on survey measures of
program participation, which suffer from significant reporting error, when
conducting impact evaluations (Meyer, Mok & Sullivan 2015, Nguimkeu et al. 2017).
Administrative data are ordinarily assumed to be the “gold standard” to overcoming
these econometric challenges, but relatively little evidence exists on the potential
problems with administrative records or econometric strategies to address them. We
investigate these issues using data from the FoodAPS, which combines a panel of
household purchases with a survey and linked administrative data on Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) participation from both state enrollment
records and Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card expenditures. The data,
therefore, provide the unique opportunity to evaluate the reliability of
administrative records by comparing the two different administrative measures to
each other as well as to self-reported participation. Moreover, the data also allow us
to examine the sensitivity of participation and misreporting rates and estimated
associations between SNAP and food insecurity, obesity, and diet healthfulness to
different approaches to cleaning and combining the administrative participation
variables.
SNAP is the largest means-tested nutrition assistance program in the U.S.,
serving millions of low-income individuals and households. It is administered by the
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U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with the objectives of increasing food
security, reducing hunger, and improving health and well-being of low-income
individuals and households by expanding access to food, nutritious diets, and
nutrition education (Mabli et al. 2013). The number of Americans receiving SNAP
benefits tripled from about 17 million to 46 million between 2000 and 2014, while
total spending on SNAP has more than quadrupled from about $174 billion to
almost $75 billion.1
Proponents assert that SNAP participation reduces food insecurity, lifts millions
from poverty, and provides a fiscal boost to the economy during downturns (U.S.
Department of Agriculture 2012). However, the empirical literature on the impacts
of SNAP has produced mixed results. Several studies have documented the
expected negative relationship between SNAP and food insecurity (Van Hook &
Balistreri 2006, Nord & Prell 2011, Schmidt, Shore-Sheppard & Watson 2016), but
others have found statistically insignificant or even positive associations (Gundersen
& Oliveira 2001, Hofferth 2004, Huffman, Jensen et al. 2003, Wilde & Nord 2005,
Hoynes & Schanzenbach 2016). SNAP is also often found to be positively correlated
with obesity, but some studies find insignificant or negative effects (Meyerhoefer &
Pylypchuk 2008, Bartfeld et al. 2015, Almada et al. 2016, Almada & Tchernis 2016,
Nguimkeu et al. 2017).
These mixed results reflect two main methodological challenges in evaluating the
causal effects of SNAP. The first is non-random selection. SNAP participation is
endogenous, so there is a strong likelihood that specific unobservable characteristics
are correlated with both SNAP participation and nutrition-related outcomes. Such
factors might include current or expected future health, human capital, financial
stability, and attitudes toward work (Currie 2003, Kreider et al. 2012).
The second identification problem, and the focus of our paper, is measurement
1

Statistics are from http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap.
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error in SNAP participation, which occurs when SNAP participants are coded as
receiving no benefits when they truly did (false negatives) or vice versa (false
positives). Misreporting of SNAP participation in national surveys has been
documented with false negatives being much more prevalent than false positives.2
For instance, the estimated false negative rates for SNAP in various surveys range
from 20% to almost 50% (Mittag 2013, Meyer & Goerge 2011). There is a growing
literature suggesting that the estimated effect of a misclassified binary explanatory
variable (such as SNAP participation) may be substantially biased and may even
yield “wrong signs" (Kreider 2010, Kreider et al. 2012, Nguimkeu et al. 2017).
Within a one-sided model of endogenous misreporting, (Nguimkeu et al. 2017)
provide sign-switching results for the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator even
when participation is exogenous. In this case, they show that the OLS estimator
yields the wrong sign if misreporting is endogenous, with the size of the
sign-switching region increasing with the rate of false negatives and decreasing with
the true participation rate. Similar severe consequences of reporting errors also
occur within an instrumental variables framework (Almada et al. 2016). Most
researchers using survey data to study SNAP do not account for the possibility of
non-classical measurement error and the few that do so make assumptions akin to
random misreporting.
A fundamental difficulty in dealing with misreporting is that true participation
status is unobserved in almost all surveys, and validation datasets that link survey
responses to administrative records are scarce. Ultimately, the usefulness of linked
administrative records depends crucially on the quality of the linkage. While
administrative data are usually considered the “gold standard,” they can still be
missing, incorrectly entered, or outdated. Some measurement error may therefore
remain. By linking survey responses to administrative data on SNAP participation
2

See Bound et al. (2001) for a comprehensive review of measurement error in survey data.
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from two different sources, FoodAPS provides a unique opportunity to investigate
issues related to measurement error in both self-reported and administrative
measures.
Specifically, we use data from the FoodAPS to offer some novel insights related
to the reliability of linked administrative SNAP measures. First, we document
substantial ambiguity in both of the administrative measures and show that they
are only slightly more strongly correlated with each other than with self-reported
participation. Estimated SNAP participation and misreporting rates vary with the
coding rules used to resolve this ambiguity and disagreement. We then examine the
relationships between SNAP and food insecurity, obesity, and the Healthy Eating
Index. While the signs of regression estimates are not sensitive to different coding
rules, their magnitudes and levels of statistical significance exhibit meaningful
variability. In sum, these results serve as a cautionary tale about uncritically relying
on linked administrative records when conducting program evaluation research.
4.2

Data

The FoodAPS survey is the first nationally representative survey of U.S. households
to collect comprehensive data about household food purchases as well as health and
nutrition outcomes. FoodAPS is sponsored by the Economic Research Service
(ERS) and the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the USDA to support critical
research that informs policymaking on health and obesity, food insecurity, and
nutrition assistance policy.
The FoodAPS surveyed 4,826 households through a multistage sampling design
with a target population roughly equally divided into SNAP households,
non-participating low income households with income less than the poverty
guideline, non-participating households with income between 100 percent and 185
percent of the poverty guideline, and non-participating households with income at
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least equal to 185 percent of the poverty guideline.3 Survey questions relate to
demographic characteristics, income, program participation, food insecurity, health,
weight, and height. Also, FoodAPS contains detailed information about individual
food purchases and acquisitions (merged with nutrition information), along with
variables related to local food availability and prices. A unique feature of FoodAPS
that makes it well-suited for our study is the linked administrative records on SNAP
participation for consenting respondents. This presents an opportunity to study
SNAP misreporting more thoroughly than past research.
Participants were interviewed before they were given a survey to record their
food purchases for one week. Self-reported SNAP participation comes from the
Initial Interview before the survey week. The primary respondent (PR) was asked
about SNAP receipt, including information on the date of last receipt and the
amount of benefits received. The PR was the designated “main food shopper” for
the household. The specific question asking about SNAP participation states, “(Do
you/Does anyone in your household) receive benefits from the SNAP program? This
program used to be called food stamps. It puts money on a SNAP EBT card that
you can use to buy food.” This question (named SNAPNOWREPORT on the
FoodAPS data files) does not specify a reference period, and only respondents who
answered “yes” were further asked to provide dates of the last receipt as well as
benefit amounts received. Respondents who answered “no” were then asked, “Have
(you/anyone in your household) ever received benefits from the SNAP program?”
Households who responded in the affirmative to this follow-up question were further
asked, “Did (you/anyone in your household) receive SNAP benefits in the last 12
months?” Respondents who answered “yes” to both follow-up questions were also

3

The FoodAPS field operations were conducted from April 2012 through January 2013, during
which each participating household provided information on all acquisitions of all household members
during a 7-day interview period.
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asked to provide a date of the last receipt.4 For our indicator of reported SNAP
participation (hereinafter “REPORT”), we consider all respondents who answered
“yes” to be self-reported participators (including those who answered “no” to the
first participation question but “yes” to both follow-up questions), and consider the
time-frame to reflect either current or recent participation.5 In our view, a flexible
time-frame is reasonable, as our outcomes (particularly BMI, which is a capital
stock) may not respond immediately to changes in benefit receipt, while people who
have recently become non-participants may still spend down previously accrued
benefits during the reference period.
The FoodAPS contains two distinct administrative measures of SNAP
participation. The first is from state caseload files covering March 2012 to November
2012 (“ADMIN”). The second is from the electronic benefit transfer (EBT) ALERT
database (“ALERT”).6 The ALERT transaction data contain one recorded swipe of
an EBT Card per user from April through December 2012. FoodAPS is the only
nationally representative survey that links reported SNAP participation to two
administrative sources, thus making it particularly suitable for our purposes.
While such administrative records sound appealing, they have several limitations
that likely lead to measurement error. Both ADMIN and ALERT variables do not
always agree either with each other or with the self-reported participation; they also
contain various levels of missing data and could be mismeasured. The quality and
4

66 out of the 1461 people who answered “yes” to the first participation question subsequently
reported date of the last receipt outside of the previous 31 days. Also, 8 out of 171 people who
answered “no” to the first participation question but “yes” to both follow-up participation questions
reported date of the last receipt within the previous 31 days. These reported dates of last receipt
reflect the ambiguity about whether the initial participation question indicated current or recent
receipt of SNAP. Our conclusions remain similar if we code these individuals as non-participants.
5
We thank John Kirlin for suggesting this modification to the original SNAPNOWREPORT via
email correspondence.
6
The EBT ALERT database is Anti-Fraud Locator EBT Retailer Transactions (ALERT) system
of the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the USDA designed to help detect signs of abuse, fraud,
and waste in the SNAP program. Each record of the EBT ALERT data represents one swipe of the
EBT card and includes such variables as information on the state, store ID, EBT account number,
date/time of the event, and purchase amount.
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availability of the administrative data vary considerably across states. Households
can fall into one of four (4) state groups: (a) Group 1: one-to-one match was
possible between ADMIN and ALERT data because they both contain the same
case identifiers (13 states); (b) Group 2: either the CASEIDs in the ALERT data
were scrambled or they are different in the ALERT and caseload data (8 states); (c)
Group 3: CASEIDs are different in the caseload and ALERT data, and the former
does not include benefit disbursement dates (2 states); and (d) Group 4: the state
did not provide SNAP enrollment data (5 states).
Another source of measurement error is that matching from the FoodAPS to
administrative SNAP records was probabilistic. All the matches to ADMIN data
were based on first name, last name, phone number, and house address (including
apartment number) and links were considered “certain matches” if the associated
matching score exceeded a pre-determined threshold.7 The linkage to the ALERT
data was similarly probabilistic, except in the state Group 1 described above. In
state Group 1, if a household first matched probabilistically to caseload data, then a
one-to-one match was possible to the ALERT data using CASEIDs. Thus, it is
reasonable to presume that the quality of the administrative linkage would be
highest in the 13 states in state Group 1. Nonetheless, the quirks of probabilistic
matching would suggest unknown degrees of error in the administrative measures of
participation in all states. In other words, one can imagine those true SNAP
households whose matching score was not high enough to be sufficiently definitive
would have to be classified as non-matches (non-participants), and vice versa.
Additionally, the ADMIN and ALERT data may contradict each other because
of discrepancies in timing. In the ADMIN data, participation is in most cases
defined based on current enrollment status during the interview week. However, in
7

The probabilistic matching was implemented using LinkageWIZ record linkage software and
resulted in a Cartesian join of each surveyed household with all SNAP enrolment record (or EBT
ALERT). The contractors determined a pre-specified score above which to classify a match as “certain.” FoodAPS does not contain the raw matching scores.
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the two states in Group 3 mentioned above, exact dates are not available; thus,
their current participation status was conditional on the results of the EBT ALERT
linkage. For instance, in a few cases, an individual is considered a current
participant if they matched at any point during the nine-month data availability
window and also matched to the EBT ALERT, with the date of the last receipt (per
ALERT) within 36 days of the end of the survey week.8 Some former and future
participants will therefore incorrectly be coded as current participants. The same
logic applies to the EBT ALERT data. In the ALERT data, an individual is coded
as a participant if she had an EBT card transaction during the survey week and
matched to the EBT ALERT data. SNAP participants who did not use the EBT
card that week - for instance, because they stocked up on groceries the previous
week, or because their monthly benefits already ran out (food stamp cycling) - were
coded as non-participants if they were also current non-participants per ADMIN.9
Another source of discrepancy regarding timing is that, while the ADMIN
variable considers matches to represent current participation if the date of the last
receipt is within 32 days of the end of the survey week, the ALERT variable uses 36
days of the end of the survey week. This may be related to the fact that the ALERT
data do not have variables indicating the exact timing of deposits into the SNAP
accounts. The ALERT issuance dates are approximate because issuance dates are
determined by noting increments in the last SNAP balance between swipes. Thus,
households classified as current recipients per ALERT may show up as current
nonrecipients per the ADMIN variable due to the shorter window used by the latter.
Finally, another issue with the ALERT data is that no match is attempted (and
8

FoodAPS’s measure of current SNAP participation based on the two administrative linkages is
summarized in the SNAPNOWADMIN variable, which combines the results of the two administrative
matches into a single variable and also imputes missing data using the self-report.
9
In the remainder (majority) of cases in the two states whose current SNAP participation cannot
be determined based on EBT ALERT matching (conditional on ADMIN) or ADMIN (conditional
on ALERT) due to missing information or non-matches, their current SNAP participation is coded
as “no match” in SNAPNOWADMIN.
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therefore the variable is missing) if the household does not either report SNAP
participation or a transaction during the survey week using an EBT card. While the
majority of such individuals are likely true non-participants, some could be true
participants whom both denied participation in the program and also did not
disclose that certain purchases during the survey week were made with an EBT
card. Given the high prevalence of false negatives reported in the literature, the
fraction of such individuals could be non-trivial.
These issues create substantial ambiguity about the “correct” ways to code the
administrative variables that we will explore in more detail in the following section.
For now, we define the baseline versions of these two measures as follows. We set
ADMIN=1 if there is a successful match to caseload records, even if the date of the
match is outside of the previous month or missing. The rationale for the flexible
timing mirrors that discussed above for the self-reported measure. We set
ADMIN=0 for individuals who did not match to the caseload records, and leave the
variable missing for those in states that did not provide caseload records. For
ALERT, we assign a value of 1 if there is a confirmed match (again, regardless of
whether the match occurs during the survey month) and 0 if a match was
attempted but unsuccessful. If no match was attempted because either there were
no EBT-type payments or no SNAP-authorized store acquisitions for households not
reporting EBT-type payments, we set ALERT to missing.
Our first two dependent variables relate to food insecurity. These come from the
ten-question household food security questionnaire included in FoodAPS based on
USDA’s 30-day Food Security Scale.10 The specific outcomes are a dummy for
whether the household has low food security (defined as having affirmative
responses to three to five questions) and a dummy for whether the household has
very low food security (six or more affirmative responses).
10

Please see Table 4.10 for the list of question on the ten-question household food security ques-

tion.
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The next several dependent variables relate to body weight. The FoodAPS
contains self-reported height and weight for the household responder. We use this
information to create three outcomes: body mass index (BMI) and indicators for
obese (BMI≥30) and severely obese (BMI≥35).11 Dichotomous variables are often
used in addition to continuous BMI in the obesity literature since health is not
monotonically decreasing in weight. Weight gain generally improves health at low
levels of BMI, and the large increase in mortality risk from excess weight does not
begin until around the severe obesity threshold Courtemanche, Pinkston, Ruhm &
Wehby (2016). The health implications of any impacts of SNAP would depend on
the portion of the BMI distribution in which the effects are strongest (i.e., the
health implications of SNAP’s effects would potentially be more substantial if they
are stronger on severe obesity).
The final dependent variable relates to food purchases. Following prior studies
such as Volpe, Okrent & Leibtag (2013), we use a summary measure of the
healthfulness of food purchases called the Healthy Eating Index (HEI). The
HEI-2010, designed by the USDA, aims to capture the degree of adherence to
dietary guidelines. We use the total HEI-2010 scores for all items for all the entire
survey week for each household.12 The HEI score is made up of 12 components
which sum up to a maximum score of 100. This HEI variable is computed by
FoodAPS staff and available as a linkable auxiliary dataset.
The FoodAPS also contains a number of variables that we use as controls. These
include dummy variables for gender, educational attainment (dummy variables for
having less than high school diploma, high school diploma but no college education,
and some college education, with college degree or higher being the omitted base
category), race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic black and non-Hispanic white, with other
being the base category), marital status (married and formerly married, with never
11
12

Body mass index is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in square meters.
Further information on HEI scores can be found at http://epi.grants.cancer.gov/hei.
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married as the base category), whether any individuals under 5 years old or at least
65 years old are present in the household, whether the respondent worked last week,
whether the household lives in rural census tract, and whether the household’s
primary food store is SNAP-authorized. Continuous controls include respondent’s
age, household size, number of children, household monthly gross total income, and
straight-line distance from household’s residence to its primary food store (in miles).
Our final sample is subject to four restrictions. First, we include only households
in which the primary respondent is at least 18 years old. Second, we drop households
with missing values of any variables. Next, we follow Mykerezi & Mills (2010) and
Almada et al. (2016)and drop those with incomes over 250% FPL. The final step is
to exclude 122 households who did not provide consent for administrative
verification. The resulting sample contains 2,108 households. The sample sizes in
some of the sensitivity checks will vary, though, as we will experiment with different
ways to handle ambiguous cases in the administrative SNAP variables.
Table 1 presents means and standard deviations for our main sample. The
SNAP participation rate is 32 percent using the self-report compared to 29 percent
with ADMIN and 30 percent with ALERT. The correlations between the three
measures are 0.782 for REPORT and ADMIN, 0.792 for REPORT and ALERT, and
0.847 for ADMIN and ALERT. In other words, the two administrative measures
exhibit almost as much disagreement with each other as either of them do with the
self-reported measure. FoodAPS’s primary respondents have an average BMI of
28.81, while 38 percent are obese and 16 percent are severely obese. About 20
percent of FoodAPS households are food insecure (low food security) while 13
percent experience very low food security. In terms of compliance with the U.S.
Dietary Guidelines for Americans, FoodAPS households have an average HEI score
of 50.56 out of a maximum score of 100; higher HEI scores indicate greater
conformity with recommended dietary guidelines.
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The primary respondents are on average, about 49 years old with a household
size of about 2.56. Also, almost 71 percent of the primary respondents are female,
31 percent are married, 16 percent are black, 71 percent are white, and about 38
percent report having worked last week. FoodAPS primary respondents have a gross
monthly income of about $1,860 and live in households with 26 percent holding
college degrees or higher, 21 percent with some college education, 34 percent with a
high school diploma, and 19 percent with less than high school diploma. Finally, 33
percent of FoodAPS household live in a rural census tract, 61 percent have children
at most five years of age, and 28 percent have elderly at least 65 years present.
4.3

Sensitivity of Participation and Misreporting Rates

This section examines the sensitivity of SNAP participation and misreporting rates
along two dimensions. The first type of sensitivity concerns different classification
choices for the potentially ambiguous cases when continuing to use ADMIN and
ALERT separately. The second is with respect to different approaches to combining
ADMIN and ALERT into a single, “true” participation measure.
Different Classification Choices for ADMIN and ALERT Separately
The discussion of the SNAP variables in Section II revealed several challenges when
coding ADMIN and ALERT. Tables 2 and 3 categorize the potential values of these
variables to elucidate the specific sources of ambiguity. The tables also report the
number of households in each category, how they are classified in the “baseline”
classification used in Section II, and other reasonable ways in which they could be
classified. The latter is given in the column names “Alternate 1” through “Alternate
3,” wherein each column the specific categorization that differs from the baseline
choice is in bold.
Focusing first on the ADMIN variable in Table 2, we see that there are five
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different broad categories a household can fall into. First is the straightforward case
where the state did not make caseload records available, and therefore the ADMIN
variable is clearly missing. The second category contains the most definitive
non-participants: households who did not match to caseload records. Conceivably,
someone could be a true participant but not match due to, for instance, name
misspellings, or changes in household identifying information such as addresses and
phone numbers. We expect such cases to be infrequent enough that exploring an
alternate classification is not warranted, especially considering that some matches to
the caseload data not deemed to be automatically “certain” were manually reviewed
to address such concerns. Category 3 consists of the clearest participants: those who
matched to caseload records within the 32 days before and including the survey
week.
The final two categories are the most ambiguous. Category 4 contains
households that matched to caseload records but with a date outside the 32-day
window. As discussed in Section II, the intention of our baseline classifications is to
measure either current or recent participation, in which case the most natural
classification of these households is as participators. Moreover, a sizeable number of
households show matches in both the months immediately before and after the
survey month, but not in the survey month. In these cases, the lack of a match in
the survey month is likely an error, and a determination of “current participant”
seems reasonable. Nonetheless, the lack of an exact match on timing creates
sufficient ambiguity to warrant sensitivity analyses. Alternate Classification 1,
therefore, considers households in Category 4 to be non-participants, while Alternate
Classification 2 treats them as missing. Category 5 consists of those who matched to
caseload records, but the dates of SNAP receipt are not available. Again, since our
goal with the baseline classifications is to capture current or recent participation, the
lack of an exact date is not especially problematic, so we consider these households
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to be participators. However, if the objective was to measure current participation,
strictly speaking, the lack of an exact date would prevent any determination from
being made, so Alternate Classification 3 treats these households as missing.
Turning to the ALERT variable in Table 3, households can fall into four different
categories. Category 1 contains those for whom no match was attempted. This
could happen for three reasons. First, no match was attempted if the respondent
did not self-report SNAP receipt or any EBT-type payments. While most such
individuals are likely true non-participants, this might not be the case for all of
them. We already know that some people falsely report not receiving SNAP, and it
seems plausible that some of these same people would also not voluntarily disclose
using an EBT card for any of their purchases. A match to EBT records was also not
attempted if the individual reported SNAP participation but did not make a
purchase at a SNAP-eligible store during the survey week. While some of these
individuals may be genuine false positives, others might have simply not gone to the
grocery store that week. Category 1 households could also be those who did not
match to the ADMIN data to provide a CASEID that would permit a deterministic
match to the EBT ALERT database. Given the substantial ambiguity surrounding
Category 1 households, we code them as missing in our baseline classification but
treat them as non-participants in Alternative Classification 3.
ALERT Categories 2 and 3 parallel those same numbered categories from the
ADMIN data. Category 2 contains those for whom a match was attempted but not
successful, indicating non-participation. Category 3 indicates a match to the EBT
ALERT database was successful with date of last receipt within the 36-day window.
Since the ALERT matches were probabilistic based on STOREID, amount, and
date, it is conceivable that some of the Category 2 households may have failed to
match due to reasons such as mistakes in the reported amounts and dates.
Analogously, some of the Category 3 households may have been determined
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manually when a single FoodAPS transaction matched to multiple ALERT
transactions. Thus, the final account number assigned to the FoodAPS transaction
may result in an erroneous Category 3 determination. However, in our judgment
such misclassification is unlikely to happen in more than a few cases, so we do not
consider alternative classifications of ALERT Categories 2 and 3.
ALERT Category 4 households are similar to ADMIN Category 4 above; they
matched to the EBT ALERT database, but the associated date of the last receipt is
outside of the 36-day window. For similar reasons as mentioned above, we initially
consider these households to be true participants, but Alternate Classification 1
considers them to be non-participants while Alternate Classification 2 treats them
as missing.
Table 4 presents estimated participation and error rates for the various ADMIN
and ALERT classification choices discussed above. Panel A uses the baseline
classifications and the main sample that drops observations with missing values of
either ADMIN or ALERT (under their baseline classifications) or any of the control
variables. This enables an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the differences caused
by ADMIN versus ALERT within the same sample. Panel B allows the sample size
to vary depending on the treatment of missing data. The row labeled “ADMIN
Baseline” in Panel B adds back in the observations with a valid value of that
variable but missing “ALERT baseline,” and vice versa. The rows for the alternate
classifications can either contain more or fewer observations depending on the
relative stringency of the criteria for handling ambiguous cases. For instance, the
sample is much larger for “ALERT Alternate 3” than “ALERT Baseline” because the
former treats the large number of households for whom no match was attempted
(Category 1) as non-participants, whereas the latter considers them missing.
Panel A shows that the participation and misreporting rates in the main sample
are broadly similar using the baseline constructions of ADMIN and ALERT. The
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estimated SNAP participation rate is 29% using ADMIN compared to 30% using
ALERT. The false negative rates are 11.65 percent using ADMIN and 11.46 percent
using ALERT, while the false positive rates are 8.39 percent using ADMIN and 7.83
percent using ALERT. Interestingly, for both participation measures, the prevalence
of false negatives is substantially lower than previously reported by studies using
more traditional survey datasets (Mittag 2013, Meyer & Goerge 2011). One possible
explanation is that FoodAPS households were asked to consent to having their
responses verified. Even though all but 122 households gave consent, it is reasonable
to presume that merely informing respondents about data verification and asking
for consent may elicit more truthful responses and partly account for the lower
estimated false negatives. Additionally, estimated false positives in the FoodAPS
are much higher than typically found. Conceivably, individuals who were unsure
whether or not their household received SNAP might have been more inclined to
report affirmatively because of the looming verification.
Panel B documents considerable variation in participation and misreporting
rates depending on the particular classification decisions for ADMIN and ALERT.
The estimated participation rates for ADMIN vary from 23.75 percent (Alternate 1)
to 28.59 percent for our baseline ADMIN classification choice, for a spread of 4.84
percentage points, or 20 percent of the lower end of the range. The ALERT
classification choices lead to even more variability, ranging from about 24.14 percent
(Alternate 3) to 33.51 percent for our baseline ALERT classification, for a spread of
9.37 percentage points, or 39 percent. The sensitivity in false negative rates is even
more striking. For ADMIN, the estimated false negative rates vary from 6.83
percent (Alternate 2) to 13.23 percent (Alternate 3), meaning that judgment calls
about classifications could potentially cause this rate to vary by up to 94%. The
false negative rates using ALERT range from 6.55 percent (Alternate 2) to 10.89
percent (Alternate 1), for a spread of 66%. The false positive rate for ADMIN is less
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sensitive, ranging from a low of 6.75 percent (Alternative 1) to 8.08 percent in each
of the other three cases, for a difference of 20 percent. For ALERT, the estimated
false positives range from 7.04 percent (Alternative 1) to 12.17 percent (Alternative
3), for a more substantial spread of 73%. Despite the considerable variation in these
estimates, the finding that the false negative rate is notably lower in the FoodAPS
than other surveys while the false positive rate is higher is nonetheless robust to all
classifications.
Different Classification Choices for Combining ADMIN and ALERT
This section introduces several approaches or ad hoc rules to consolidate the two
administrative participation measures into a single “true” participation variable and
then evaluates how these rules influence the estimated rates of SNAP participation
and misreporting. For the rest of this section, ADMIN and ALERT refer to the
baseline classification choices as described in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. We
develop five decision rules to combine the administrative participation variables as
follows:
1. Always use ADMIN unless missing. For households missing ADMIN data,
their participation status is set to ALERT.
2. Always use ALERT unless missing. For households missing ALERT data,
their participation status is set to ADMIN.
3. Drop if Disagreement: This rule sets the “true” participation variable to equal
to both ADMIN and ALERT, only if they agree (i.e., if ADMIN=ALERT=i,
i=0, 1). When they disagree or if either of them is missing, the “true” variable
is set to missing. This conservative approach will minimize errant
classification but at a substantial cost to sample size.
4. More weight to matches: This rule is similar to (3) as it uses both ADMIN
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and ALERT if they agree. However, when they disagree, we set the “true”
status to participation (“1”), unless either is missing in which case the “true”
status is set to the value of the non-missing variable. In other words, this rule
treats households as “true” participants if at least ADMIN or ALERT confirms
participation. Otherwise, the household is considered a non-participant unless
both are missing.
5. More weight to non-matches: This rule is the reverse of (4). When ADMIN
and ALERT disagree, we set the “true” status to non-participation (“0”),
unless either is missing in which case the “true” status is set to the value of the
non-missing variable. In other words, this rule treats households as “true”
non-participants if at least ADMIN or ALERT confirms non-participation.
Otherwise, the household is considered a participant unless both are missing.
Table 5 presents estimates of participation, false negative, and false positive
rates under each of the above decision rules. The estimated participation rates
range from 28.25 percent (Rule 3) to 34.81 percent (Rule 5). This is a spread of
6.56, which represents 23% of the low end of the range. The estimated false negative
rates range from 10.71 percent (Rule 5) to 12.28 percent (Rule 1), for a spread of
1.57 percentage points, or 15%. The false positive rates vary quite substantially,
from 4.53 (Rule 3) to 11.41 percent (Rule 5), for a spread of over 150%. While our
decision rules are by no means exhaustive, this exercise illustrates that how one
chooses to resolve the ambiguity in the administrative variables has nontrivial
consequences for estimated participation and reporting errors.
Some patterns also emerge. First, as expected, giving the benefit of the doubt to
matches (Rule 4) leads to a relatively high estimated participation rate, and keeps
the rate of false positives low but at the expense of a high rate of false negatives.
The reverse is true when we give the benefit of the doubt to non-matches (Rule 5).
Perhaps more surprising is that dropping cases where there is any ambiguity
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(ADMIN and ALERT disagree or either are missing; Rule 3) results in the lowest
estimated participation rate, lowest rate of false positives, and second-lowest rate of
false negatives. In other words, once we restrict the sample to households for whom
the administrative measures are likely quite accurate, we see less disagreement with
self-reported participation. There is a particularly large reduction in the number of
cases in which the respondent reports participation but the administrative data
disagree. This implies that some of the estimated misreporting observed under other
decision rules is not actually misreporting at all, but instead reflective of flaws in
the administrative variables. It is also noteworthy that the sample shrinks so much 2,446 to 1,898, or 29% - under Rule 3, underscoring that the amount of ambiguity,
and therefore scope for error, in the administrative measures is substantial.
Preferred Approach to combining REPORT, ADMIN, and ALERT
Given the ambiguity and sensitivity documented above, it is reasonable to ask
whether linked administrative data can still be used to obtain insights beyond what
could be done with self-reported information alone. The conservative Rule 3 should
lead to a very accurate participation measure but at the cost of discarding nearly a
third of the sample, which creates concerns about endogenous sample selection and
external validity. The other decision rules avoid such a large reduction in same size
but at the expense of accuracy. The goal of this section is to implement a more
detailed strategy for combining ADMIN and ALERT that utilizes self-reports to
help resolve ambiguous cases, with the goal of leveraging insights from all three
measures to produce reliable estimates while preserving sample size.
To motivate this approach, Table 6 presents information about the extent of
disagreement among the three measures as well as the extent of missing data in each
variable. Also, the last column reports how we classify disagreements into various
categories for the purpose of developing our SNAP new participation variable, which
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we refer to as our “preferred” measure. There is about 63 percent agreement among
all three measures (i.e., all three variables either indicate participation or
non-participation), which we label as Category A. The rest of the households with
non-missing self-reported data have different types of disagreement. In Category B,
making up about 10 percent of households, any two of the three measures agree
while the third is missing. Category C respondents, which account for 5 percent,
have both administrative measures agreeing but in conflict with the self-report.
Households with only the self-reported participation variable who are missing both
administrative measures (Category D) make up 12 percent, while the remaining 10
percent of respondents are lumped into miscellaneous types of disagreement in
Category E.
The new, “preferred” measure of SNAP participation combines information from
Categories A, B, and C and sets to missing observations in Categories D and E. For
Category A, all three variables are in agreement, so we are comfortable setting the
“true” participation variable equal to the associated value. For Category B, we are
also comfortable making a determination since, although one variable is missing, the
other two agree. For Category C, we consider the self-reported participation value
to be erroneous since it opposes both administrative measures, and there is no
particular reason to expect errors in the administrative variables to be correlated
with each other. This maintains the preference for administrative records if the
information from those records appears to be reliable. Next, those in Category D
have non-missing self-reported participation but are missing both administrative
measures. We code their participation as missing given the established concerns in
the literature about relying only on self-reports. Finally, we also set the
participation status of respondents in Category E to missing. There are three types
of Category E households: ADMIN and ALERT are non-missing but disagree,
ADMIN and REPORT disagree while ALERT is missing, and ALERT and
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REPORT disagree with ADMIN missing. In such cases of explicit disagreement, a
determination cannot be reached without establishing a rank ordering among the
measures.
Ultimately, our preferred measure is non-missing for the entire main sample of
2,108 respondents. Relative to the sample sizes using the various decision rules in
Table 5, this is less than the 2,446 observations obtained using decision rules that
force an outcome even in ambiguous cases, but significantly larger than the 1,898
observations obtained under the conservative Rule 3. The estimated participation
rate using the preferred measure is 30.92 percent, which is slightly higher than those
obtained using ADMIN and ALERT separately (Panel A in Table 4) but well within
the ranges established by the various sensitivity checks in Tables 4 and 5.13
4.4

Econometric Analyses and Results

We next turn to our regression estimates of the associations of SNAP with food
insecurity, weight outcomes, and dietary healthfulness. This section’s goal is to
illustrate the sensitivity of these estimates to the assumptions, introduced in the
previous section, about how to code ADMIN and ALERT separately as well as how
to assign “true” participation in cases of disagreement between them. We do not
attempt to address the endogeneity of participation because doing so with a single
cross-section of data such as the FoodAPS is daunting, and our focus here is to
examine measurement issues rather than identify causal effects. Negative selection
into SNAP is well-documented in the literature, so our OLS estimates will likely be
biased toward unfavorable outcomes (greater food insecurity, higher BMI and
obesity rates, and less healthy diets), even aside from measurement issues.
Our regressions take the form
13

The preferred SNAP participation measure leads to relatively low estimated rates of false negatives (8.53 percent) and false positives (3.99 percent), but this is by construction since the selfreported value is factored into the coding process.
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yis = β0 + β1 SN APis + β2 Xis + εis ,

(4.1)

where yis is the outcome variable for individual/household i (separate regressions
for each of the outcomes discussed in Section 4.2), SN APis is an indicator of SNAP
participation (separate regressions for each decision rule from Section 4.3), is a
vector of the control variables from Section 4.2, and εis is the error term.
Measurement error in a binary variable is necessarily non-classical, so one cannot
simply assume to be biased toward zero (Kreider 2010, Kreider et al. 2012,
Nguimkeu et al. 2017). Measurement error in SNAP participation could potentially
even lead the OLS estimator to be wrongly signed. It might be reasonable to suspect
that some of the inconsistencies among the administrative measures, such as the
inability to match names with sufficient certainty, are as good as random. However,
other inconsistencies, such as appearing in the caseload records but not using an
EBT card in the past 30 days, arise from personal choices and may, therefore, be
correlated with the error term, hence leading to endogenous misclassification.
We begin our presentation of the regression results with Table 7, which uses the
main sample and compares OLS estimates (linear probability model if the outcome
is binary) using REPORT, the baseline version of ADMIN (as described in Table 2),
and the baseline version of ALERT (as described in Table 3). Similar to Panel A of
Table 4, the purpose here is to use a common sample to provide an apples-to-apples
comparison of the results across the three measures. The first key result is that the
results are qualitatively similar regardless of the SNAP participation measure used.
As expected, SNAP participation is consistently associated with worse values of all
six outcomes. Estimates for food insecurity and body mass index are significant at
the 1% level for all three SNAP measures, while those for very low food security are
never significant. Mild discrepancies are observed for HEI and obesity, as two of the
estimates are significant at the 1% level while the third (using ALERT for HEI,
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ADMIN for obesity) is significant at the 5% level. For severe obesity, the estimates
for REPORT and ADMIN are significant at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively,
while the estimate for ALERT is insignificant.
The magnitudes, however, are more sensitive to the choice of SNAP measure.
The associations between SNAP and food insecurity range from 6 to 7 percentage
points, for a 16.67 percent spread. The estimates for very low food security vary
between 2 and 2.7 percentage points, or 35 percent. SNAP reduces HEI by between
1.3 and 2 units, for a sizeable 54 percent difference. The results for BMI are less
sensitive, as they only vary from 1.05 to 1.17 units, or 11%. Greater sensitivity is
observed for the dichotomous weight outcomes. The estimates for Pr(Obese) and
Pr(Severely Obese) range from 5.7 to 7.9 and 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points,
respectively, for spreads of 39% and 86%. Note also that the pattern of results is
inconsistent with simple attenuation bias, in which case we would expect the
magnitudes to be larger using the administrative SNAP measures than the
self-report. For three of the outcomes the magnitudes are actually largest using
self-reported participation, and in only one case is the magnitude using self-reported
participation the smallest. This is consistent with the reporting error being
non-classical (which can yield an expansion bias), but is also consistent with the
administrative measures not being any more reliable than the self-report (i.e. there
is some attenuation bias regardless of the measure used).
Table 8 presents similar OLS results using the self-reported participation and the
eight classification choices described in Tables 2 and 3. The first row reports the
estimates using the self-reported participation variable. The next eight rows use the
different classification rules for coding ADMIN and ALERT separately. As in Table
7, for all outcomes the signs are robust across SNAP measures. However, there are
some noteworthy differences in terms of significance levels and magnitudes. For
instance, the association between self-reported SNAP participation and very low
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food security is a sizeable and statistically significant 4 percentage points. In
contrast, the same association is never significant using any classification scheme for
the administrative measures, and the magnitudes are much smaller: 0.2 to 2.3
percentage points. Recall from Table 7 that using the self-report also led to an
insignificant result for very low food security for the common sample, meaning that
much of the sensitivity observed here is actually from the difference in sample (i.e.
adding back in 27 to 680 observations with non-missing self-reports but a missing
value of one or both administrative measures depending on the administrative
classification). This underscores the external validity concerns raised by the large
amounts of missing data for the administrative variables.
The results for HEI and severe obesity are also quite sensitive. For HEI, the
estimates using REPORT and ADMIN are large (-1.42 to -1.66 units) and
significant, but they shrink considerably (-0.72 to -1.2) using ALERT and are only
significant in two of the four cases. Accordingly, the spread between the smallest
and largest magnitude for HEI is over 130%. For severe obesity, the estimates range
from 4.5 to 5.2 percentage points using REPORT and ADMIN, but shrink to 1.2 to
2.3 percentage points using ALERT and are always insignificant. The spread for
severe obesity is therefore an enormous 333%.
Finally, Table 9 presents regression results using the five decision rules as well as
our preferred consolidation rule discussed in Section 4.3. Additionally, we consider a
version of our preferred measure that imputes the missing values from Categories D
and E. We perform multiple imputations under the assumption that missing data is
correlated with observables but conditionally independent of unobservables, usually
referred to as a “Missing at Random (MAR)” assumption. We implement the
multiple imputation procedures using Stata’s mi impute and mi estimate
commands, with 50 multiply imputed samples.
The first five rows show the results using the ad hoc decision rules, while the last
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two rows use our preferred measure both with and without imputation. Again, the
signs are robust to the different SNAP measures, but there are important differences
in significance levels and magnitudes. For instance, the association between SNAP
and very low food security is significant and large (3.4 percentage points) using Rule
3 but insignificant in the other cases with a magnitude as small as 0.9. The
difference between the largest and smallest estimates is therefore 280%. The
estimate for HEI is usually significant and reaches as large as -1.69 units, but it is
an insignificant -0.9 units under Rule 1, for a spread of 88%. For severe obesity,
significance levels are again mixed, with the estimates ranging from 2.1 to 4.7
percentage points (spread of 124%).
Using the preferred measure, the results are very similar both with and without
imputation. SNAP is predicted to increase the probabilities of being food insecure,
having very low food security, being obese, and being severely obese by 6.7, 2.7, 7.2,
and 4.5 percentage points, respectively. SNAP also increases BMI by 1.45 units and
reduces HEI by 1.4 units. SNAP is significant at the 5% level or better for all
outcomes except very low food security.
Summarizing, we find that the classification choices one makes with FoodAPS’s
three participation measures (REPORT, ADMIN, and ALERT) have important
consequences not only for estimated participation and reporting error rates but also
for the estimated associations between SNAP and food security, diet healthfulness,
and weight outcomes. However, the different classification choices do not seem to
matter for the signs of the estimated associations since they line up with our
expectations if we suppose that participants are negatively selected.
4.5

Conclusion

This paper leverages the availability of self-reported and two different
administrative measures of SNAP participation in the FoodAPS to investigate
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several issues related to SNAP and measurement error. We first present evidence
that the two administrative SNAP variables suffer from considerable ambiguity and
disagree with each other almost as much as they disagree with self-reported
participation. We then demonstrate that different methods of coding the two
administrative variables separately as well as various approaches to combining their
resulting preferred versions into a single “true” participation measure can lead to
meaningfully different estimated participation and misreporting rates. Next, we
document similar sensitivity to assumptions about the administrative variables
across ordinary least squares estimates of the associations of SNAP with food
insecurity, body weight, and healthfulness of food purchases.
Our work serves as a cautionary tale for using administrative records uncritically
under the assumption that they represent the “gold standard” with regard to
measurement. While some of the difficulties we observed with the linked
administrative variables may be unique to FoodAPS, others likely generalize to
other settings. For instance, challenges with obtaining data from all states and
differences in data quality across states are hardly unique to SNAP caseload files, as
many programs (such as Medicaid and public schools) are operated at the state or
local levels and standards for data collection may differ across different geographic
areas. Additionally, probabilistic matching between survey respondents and verified
program participants would be necessary for other contexts as well since it is
unlikely that both sources include universal identifiers such as social security
numbers. The fact that matches to EBT transaction data were not attempted for
individuals who (perhaps erroneously) reported not participating in SNAP points to
the broader tradeoff between rigor and budgetary/practical constraints during data
collection. When faced with a choice between nationwide surveys and
administrative records that are only available for certain areas and potentially
flawed for others, it is not obvious that the administrative data are preferable.
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With all that said, we do not stop at pointing out the flaws in administrative
data. Instead, we propose a strategy to construct a single, “true” participation
variable based on all available information from both administrative and
self-reported measures. This allows us to obtain “preferred” results, both for
participation rates and regression estimates. Similar strategies could potentially be
utilized in other contexts as well.
Nonetheless, our study suffers from several limitations that should be addressed
in future work. For instance, while we propose a method that intuitively should
minimize measurement error, there is no way to directly test whether it indeed
accomplishes that objective or whether other strategies could be superior.
Additionally, we purposefully do not address endogenous SNAP participation
because of inherent difficulties in pursuing standard IV methods with a single
cross-section data with a relatively small sample size. Much is therefore left to be
learned about both the impacts of SNAP and best practices for measurement when
multiple flawed indicators of program participation are available.
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4.6

Figures and Tables

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean (Standard Error)

SNAP Participation
Self-Reported (REPORT)
Administrative from Caseload Data (ADMIN)
Administrative from EBT Transactions (ALERT)
Dependent Variables
Low Food Security
Very Low Food Security
Total 2010 HEI Score
Body Mass Index
Obese
Severely Obese
Control Variables
Age (years)
Female
Black
White
Other race (non-black, non-white)
Married
Formerly Married
Household Size
Number of children
Rural Tract
Less than High School Education
High School Graduate
Some College Education
College Degree or Higher
Worked Last Week
Gross Monthly Family Income (Thousand Dollars)
Child Less than 5 years present in HH
Elderly at least 65 years present in HH
Never Married
Straight-line Distance from residence to primary food store (miles)
Primary food store is SNAP-authorized

0.32 (0.02)
0.29 (0.02)
0.30 (0.02)
0.20 (0.02)
0.13 (0.01)
50.56 (0.58)
28.81 (0.25)
0.38 (0.02)
0.16 (0.01)
49.62 (0.98)
0.71 (0.02)
0.16 (0.03)
0.71 (0.04)
0.13 (0.02)
0.31 (0.02)
0.43 (0.02)
2.56 (0.10)
0.93 (0.07)
0.33 (0.06)
0.19 (0.02)
0.34 (0.02)
0.21 (0.01)
0.26 (0.02)
0.38 (0.03)
1.86 (0.06)
0.61 (0.02)
0.28 (0.03)
0.26 (0.02)
3.15 (0.34)
0.98 (0.00)

Statistics are from main analysis sample of 2108 observations. Observations are weighted to account for the
complex sampling design of FoodAPS.
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Table 4.2: Possible Classifications for Administrative Participation Measure from Caseload Data (ADMIN)
Category

Description

1
2

ADMIN data not available from state
448
Match to caseload data attempted but did not meet 1268
threshold for certainty
Match confirms participation within 32 days of the sur- 763
vey week
Match confirms participation more than 32 days before 134
the survey week or after the survey week
Match confirms participation but dates not available
175

3
4
5

N
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Based on the main sample augmented with observations with missing ADMIN
or ALERT but not any other variable.

Baseline
Classification

Alternate
1

Alternate
2

Alternate
3

Missing
Nonparticipant
Participant

Missing
Nonparticipant
Participant

Missing
Nonparticipant
Participant

Missing
Nonparticipant
Participant

Participant NonMissing
Participant
participant
Participant Participant Participant Missing

Table 4.3: Possible Classifications for Administrative Participation Measure from EBT Transactions (ALERT)
Category

Description

N

Baseline
Classification

1

No acquisitions available for matching and no match to
ADMIN to provide CASEID
Match to ALERT data attempted but did not meet
threshold for certainty
Match confirms participation within 36 days of the survey week
Match confirms participation more than 32 days before
the survey week or after the survey week

574

Nonparticipant
NonNonNonNonparticipant participant participant participant
Participant Participant Participant Participant

2
3
4

1174
961
79
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Based on the main sample augmented with observations with missing ADMIN
or ALERT but not any other variable.

Missing

Alternate
1
Missing

Alternate
2

Alternate
3

Missing

Participant NonMissing
participant

Participant

Table 4.4: Estimated Participation and Misreporting Rates under Different Approaches to Using ADMIN and ALERT Separately
Determination of final ADMIN
and ALERT status
Panel A: Main Sample
ADMIN Baseline
ALERT Baseline
Panel B: Varying Samples
ADMIN Baseline
ADMIN Alternate 1
ADMIN Alternate 2
ADMIN Alternate 3
ALERT Baseline
ALERT Alternate 1
ALERT Alternate 2
ALERT Alternate 3

Sample
Size

Participation False Neg- False PosRate (%)
ative Rate itive Rate
(%)
(%)

2108
2108

29.00
30.00

11.65
11.46

8.39
7.83

2340
2340
2206
2165
2214
2214
2135
2788

28.59
23.75
24.96
25.55
33.51
29.73
30.89
24.14

12.28
11.70
6.83
13.23
10.49
10.89
6.55
10.49

8.08
6.75
8.08
8.08
8.64
7.04
8.64
12.17

Observations are weighted to account for the complex sampling design of
FoodAPS.

Table 4.5: Estimated Participation and Misreporting Rates under Different Approaches to Combining ADMIN and ALERT
Decision Rule when ADMIN and Sample
ALERT Differ
Size

Participation False Neg- False PosRate (%)
ative Rate itive Rate
(%)
(%)

Rule 1: Always use ADMIN unless missing
Rule 2: Always use ALERT unless missing
Rule 3: Drop if disagreement
Rule 4: More weight to matches
Rule 5: More weight to nonmatches

2446

31.95

11.25

8.80

2446

32.30

11.10

8.31

1898
2446
2446

28.25
34.81
29.44

10.98
11.57
10.71

4.53
5.46
11.41

Observations are weighted to account for the complex sampling design of
FoodAPS.
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Table 4.6: Extent of Disagreement among SNAP Participation Variables
REPORT

ADMIN

ALERT

Observations

Category

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Total

0
0
0
1
1
1
.
.
.
0
0
0
1
1
1
.
.
.

0
1
.
0
1
.
0
1
.
0
1
.
0
1
.
0
1
.

952
11
144
21
77
12
1
9
261
74
69
18
109
795
58
17
79
81
2,788

A
E
B
E
C
E
B
E
D
C
E
E
E
A
B
E
B
D

Frequencies are based on the main sample augmented with observations with
missing ADMIN or ALERT but not any other variable.
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Table 4.7: Regression Results using Each Participation Measure Separately
Participation
Variable

Food
Insecurity

Very Low
Food Security

Healthy
Eating Index

Body Mass
Index

Obese

Severely
Obese

Self-Reported

0.066***
(0.020)

0.027 (0.018)

-1.680***

1.045***
(0.343)

0.079***
(0.024)

0.039**
(0.018)

-0.615
-2.071***
(0.601)

1.166***
(0.344)

0.057**
(0.023)

0.035*
(0.018)

-1.292**
(0.605)

1.114***
(0.340)

0.061***
(0.023)

0.021 (0.019)

ADMIN
ferred

Pre-

0.060***
(0.020)

0.022 (0.018)

ALERT
ferred

Pre-

0.070***
(0.020)

0.020 (0.018)
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Statistics are from main sample of 2108 observations. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the
1% level, ** 5%, * 10%.

Table 4.8: Regression Results using Each Participation Measure Separately
Body
Mass
Index

Obese

Severely
Obese

Participation Sample
Variable
Size

Food
Insecurity

Very
Low
Food
Security

Healthy
Eating
Index

SelfReported

2788

0.059***
(0.018)

0.040**
(0.016)

-1.500***
(0.541)

1.272*** 0.094*** 0.043***
(0.302)
(0.021)
(0.016)

ADMIN
Preferred

2340

0.055***
(0.019)

0.019
(0.017)

-1.663***
(0.569)

1.328*** 0.065*** 0.048***
(0.325)
(0.022)
(0.017)

ADMIN
Alternate 1

2340

0.056***
(0.020)

0.002
(0.018)

-1.484**
(0.577)

1.202*** 0.057***
(0.333)
(0.022)

ADMIN
Alternate 2

2206

0.060***
(0.020)

0.012
(0.018)

-1.640***
(0.597)

1.377*** 0.066*** 0.051***
(0.344)
(0.023)
(0.018)

ADMIN
Alternate 3

2165

0.053***
(0.020)

0.023
(0.018)

-1.417**
(0.599)

1.249***
(0.341)

ALERT
Preferred

2214

0.064***
(0.019)

0.023
(0.018)

-1.201**
(0.591)

1.154*** 0.064***
(0.333)
(0.023)

0.021
(0.018)

ALERT Alternate 1

2214

0.062***
(0.020)

0.009
(0.018)

-0.907
(0.596)

1.159*** 0.065***
(0.335)
(0.023)

0.022
(0.018)

ALERT Alternate 2

2135

0.067***
(0.020)

0.016
(0.018)

-0.66272

1.218*** 0.068***
(0.342)
(0.023)

0.023
(0.019)

ALERT Alternate 3

2788

0.052***
(0.018)

0.016
(0.016)

-0.717
(0.529)

1.133*** 0.059***
(0.302)
(0.021)

0.012
(0.017)

0.059**
(0.023)

Statistics based on the main sample augmented with observations with missing ADMIN or
ALERT but not any other variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%.
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0.045**
(0.018)

0.052***
(0.019)

Table 4.9: Regression Results Combining Participation Measures through Various Rules
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Sample
Size

Food
Insecurity

Very
Low
Food
Security

Healthy
Eating
Index

Rule 1: Always use ADMIN unless missing

2446

0.050***
(0.019)

0.022
(0.017)

-1.538***
(0.558)

Rule 2: Always use ALERT unless missing

2446

0.060***
(0.019)

0.02
(0.017)

-0.901
(0.561)

Rule 3: Drop if disagreement

1898

0.075***
(0.021)

0.028
(0.019)

Rule 4: More weight to matches

2446

0.061***
(0.019)

Rule 5: More weight to non-matches

2446

Combined (SNAP-ABC)

Combined (SNAP-ABC) with imputation

Body
Mass
Index

Obese

Severely
Obese

1.352*** 0.068*** 0.047***
(0.320)
(0.021)
(0.017)
1.308*** 0.070***
(0.316)
(0.022)

0.035**
(0.017)

-1.689***
(0.652)

1.297***
(0.363)

0.032
(0.020)

0.034**
(0.017)

-1.482***
(0.567)

1.410*** 0.071*** 0.045***
(0.316)
(0.022)
(0.017)

0.050***
(0.019)

0.009
(0.017)

-0.551862

1.276*** 0.069***
(0.321)
(0.021)

0.038**
(0.017)

2108

0.069***
(0.020)

0.026
(0.018)

-1.298**
(0.607)

1.475*** 0.073***
(0.337)
(0.023)

0.043**
(0.018)

2788

0.067***
(0.020)

0.027
(0.017)

-1.401**
(0.626)

1.447*** 0.072***
(0.328)
(0.023)

0.045**
(0.018)

Statistics based on the main sample augmented with observations with missing ADMIN or
ALERT but not any other variable. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level, ** 5%, * 10%.

0.063**
(0.025)

Table 4.10: 10-Question Food Security Question in FoodAPS
Question

Description

E2
E3
E4
E5

In last 30 days, worried food would run out before we got more money
Food ran out and had no money to buy more, in last 30 days "
Couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals, in last 30 days "
Adults skipped or cut size of meals b/c not enough money, in last 30 days (Y/N)
Universe :Answered “Sometimes not enough to eat” or “Often not enough to eat”
description of food sufficiency question within last 30 days, OR answered “Often
true” or “Sometimes true” to E2, E3 or E4. "
Number of days adults skipped/cut meal size b/c not enough money, last 30 days
Universe : Answered “Yes” to E5”
Eat less than felt you should b/c not enough money, in last 30 days (Y/N) Universe
:Answered “Sometimes not enough to eatâĂİ or “Often not enough to eat” description
of food sufficiency question within last 30 days, OR answered “Often trueâĂİ or
“Sometimes trueâĂİ to E2, E3 or E4.”
Ever hungry but didn’t eat b/c not enough money, in last 30 days (Y/N) Universe
: Answered “Sometimes not enough to eat” or “Often not enough to eat” description of food sufficiency question within last 30 days, OR answered “Often true” or
“Sometimes true” to E2, E3 or E4."
Lose weight b/c not enough money for food, in last 30 days (Y/N) Universe : Answered “Sometimes not enough to eat” or “Often not enough to eat” description of
food sufficiency question within last 30 days, OR answered “Often true” or “Sometimes true” to E2, E3 or E4.”
Skip food all day b/c not enough money for food, in last 30 days (Y/N) Universe :
Answered “Yes” to E5, E5a, E6, E7, or E8.”
“How often adults skipped food all day b/c not enough money, in last 30 days
Universe : Answered “Yes” to E9”

E5a
E6
105
E7

E8

E9
E9a
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APPENDIX A

Proof of Theorem 1
Proof.
Biasedness: By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem, see, e.g. Davidson &
MacKinnon (2004, page 68), the regression

M y = M δα + v

yields the same least squares estimate of α as the regression equation of interest
(2.8). It follows that,
α
bLS = (δ 0 M δ)−1 δ 0 M y.

(A.1)

This implies that α
bLS − α = (δ 0 M δ)−1 δ 0 M ε.
Hence, E[b
αLS − α|X, δ] = (δ 0 M δ)−1 δ 0 M E[ε|X, δ] 6= 0, since E[ε|δ, X] 6= 0 by the
correlation of ε and δ through u and v.
Inconsistency: We can write
−1

δ0M ε
α
bLS − α = (δ M δ) δ M  =
n
 0
−1  0

δ Mδ
δ M  δ 0 M (δ ∗ − δ)α
=
+
n
n
n
0

−1 0



δ0M δ
n

by Equation (2.7) (A.2)

Notice that,
δ0M δ
δ 0 [I − X(X 0 X)−1 X 0 ]δ
δ0δ δ0X
=
=
−
n
n
n
n
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X 0X
n

−1

X 0δ
n

Hence, by the Weak Law of Large Numbers and the Slutsky’s lemma, we have
δ0M δ p
−→ E(δi2 ) − E(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E(δi xi )
n
By a matrix extension of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (see Tripathi 1999), we
know that E(δi2 ) − E(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E(δi xi ) > 0. The Continuous Mapping Theorem
then implies that


δ0M δ
n

Likewise, the term

−1

−1
p 
.
−→ E(δi2 ) − E(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E(δi xi )

(A.3)

δ0M 
can also be decomposed as
n

δ0M 
δ 0 [I − X(X 0 X)−1 X 0 ]
δ0 δ0X
=
=
−
n
n
n
n



X 0X
n

−1

X 0
.
n

Then, using the same arguments as above we have
δ0M  p
−→ E(δi i ) − E(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E(xi i ) = E(δi i ),
n
where the last equality follows from Assumption 1.
Using the expression of δi given by Equation (2.4) and the trivariate normality of
(i , ui , vi ), it can be shown by integration that
E[δi i ] = E [i 1 (zi0 θ + vi ≥ 0,

wi0 γ + ui ≥ 0)]

= E [Pr[ui ≥ −wi0 γ, vi ≥ −zi0 θ, ρ]E [i |ui ≥ −wi0 γ, vi ≥ −zi0 θ]]

 0

 0

wi γ − ρzi0 θ
zi θ − ρwi0 γ
0
0
= E σϕv φ (−zi θ) Φ p
+ σϕu φ (−wi γ) Φ p
,
1 − ρ2
1 − ρ2
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where Φ(·) and φ(·) are the CDF and PDF of the standard normal. It follows that
 0

 0


wi γ − ρzi0 θ
δ0M  p
zi θ − ρwi0 γ
0
0
−→ E σϕv φ (−zi θ) Φ p
+ σϕu φ (−wi γ) Φ p
. (A.4)
n
1 − ρ2
1 − ρ2

Finally, using the same reasoning as above for the term

δ 0 M (δ ∗ − δ)α
, we have
n

δ 0 M (δ ∗ − δ)α p
−→ − αE(δi x0i )E(xi x0i )−1 E[(δi∗ − δi )xi ].
n

(A.5)

The desired result follows by taking (A.5), (A.4) and (A.3) to Equation (A.2).

Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We can write
0

0

0

0

α
b2S = (δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗ )−1 δ̂ ∗ M δ ∗ α + (δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗ )−1 δ̂ ∗ M 

(A.6)

By the exogeneity of X and Z given by Assumption 1, the consistency of θ̂, the
continuity of Φ(·) and the law of large numbers, we have
0

δ̂ ∗ M  p
−→ E[Φ(zi0 θ)i ] = E [Φ(zi0 θ)E[i |zi ]] = 0,
n
so that the second term on the RHS of Equation (A.6) goes to zero. We also have,
by Assumption 2, the consistency of θ̂, the continuity of Φ(·) and the the law of
large numbers,
0



δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗ p
−→ E Φ(zi0 θ)2 − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 E [xi Φ(zi0 θ)]
n
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and
0

δ̂ ∗ M δ ∗
p
−→
n

E [Φ(zi0 θ)δi∗ ] − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 E [xi δi∗ ]
E [Φ(zi0 θ)E[δi∗ |zi ]] − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 E [xi E[δi∗ |zi ]]


E Φ(zi0 θ)2 − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 E [xi Φ(zi0 θ)]

=
=

where the last display follows from the fact that E[δi∗ |zi ] = Φ(zi0 θ), as implied by
Equation (3.2). Hence,
0

∗0

∗0

(δ̂ M δ̂ ∗ )−1 δ̂ M δ ∗ =

δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗
n

!−1

0

δ̂ ∗ M δ ∗ p
−→ 1
n

so that
p

α
b2S −→ α

Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We can write
√

0

n(b
α2S − α) =

δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗
n

=

δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗
n

0

= qn−1

√

!−1

!−1

nV1n α +

0

δ̂ ∗ M (δ ∗ − δ̂ ∗ )
√
n
0

!

δ̂ ∗ M (Ψ∗ − δ̂ ∗ )
√
n

0

δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗
n

α+
!

0

α+

!−1

δ̂ ∗ M 
√
n

!−1

δ̂ ∗ M (α(δ ∗ − Ψ∗ ) + )
√
n

δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗
n

0

0


√
nV2n

(A.7)

where
0

δ̂ ∗ M δ̂ ∗
qn =
,
n

0

V1n

δ̂ ∗ M (Ψ∗ − δ̂ ∗ )
=
,
n
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0

and V2n

δ̂ ∗ M (α(δ ∗ − Ψ∗ ) + )
=
,
n

with Ψ∗ = Ψ∗ (θ) = [Φ(z10 θ), . . . , Φ(zn0 θ)]0 .


−1
1 Pn
1 Pn ∗ 0
∗
0
δ̂ x
Denote Λ̂i = δ̂i −
xi xi
xi and by
n i=1 i i
n i=1
Λi = Φ(zi0 θ) − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 xi its probability limit. Notice that
1 Pn
qn =
Λ̂2 . We know, from the consistency results above that
n i=1 i


p
qn −→ q = E Φ(zi0 θ)2 − E [Φ(zi0 θ)x0i ] E[xi x0i ]−1 E [Φ(zi0 θ)xi ] = E[Λ2i ].

(A.8)

Since δ̂ ∗ = Ψ∗ (θ̂), then expanding Ψ∗ (θ) in a Taylor series about θ̂, we have
a

Ψ∗ − δ̂ ∗ = ψ ∗ (θ̂)(θ − θ̂)
a

where “ =” denotes asymptotic equivalence in probability, and ψ ∗ (θ) is the vector of
partial derivatives ∂Ψ∗ (θ)/∂θ0 is given by

ψ ∗ (θ) =

∂Ψ∗ (θ)
= [φ(z10 θ)z1 , . . . , φ(zn0 θ)zn )]0 .
∂θ0

Therefore
n
∗
∗
√
√
1X
a δ̂ M ψ (θ̂) √
nV1n =
n(θ − θ̂) =
Λ̂i φ(zi0 θ̂)zi0 n(θ − θ̂).
n
n i=1
0

A direct application of the central limit theorem then gives,
√
d
nV1n α−→ N (0, α2 ν12 ),

where

ν12 = E[Λi φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]V (θ̂)E[zi φ(zi0 θ)Λi ].

Likewise,
n
√
δ̂ ∗ M (α(δ ∗ − Ψ∗ ) + )
1 X
√
nV2n =
=√
Λ̂i ζi
n
n i=1
0
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(A.9)

where ζi = α(δi∗ − Φ(zi0 θ)) + i , with E[ζi |zi ] = 0 and
Var[ζi |zi ] = α2 Φ(zi0 θ)(1 − Φ(zi0 θ)) + σ 2 .
Hence, by the central limit theorem,
√

d

nV2n −→ N (0, σ22 ),

where


σ22 = E[Λi α2 Φ(zi0 θ)(1 − Φ(zi0 θ)) + σ 2 Λi ]

(A.10)

= α2 E[Λ2i Φ(zi0 θ)(1 − Φ(zi0 θ))] + σ 2 E[Λ2i ]

Finally, the asymptotic covariance term between the elements of
√
nV2n is

√
nV1n α and

σ12 = E[Λi φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]E[(θ − θ̂) (α(δi∗ − Φ(zi0 θ)) + i )]E[Λi ]α

(A.11)

= −E[Λi φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]E[θ̂i ]E[Λi ]α

It then follows from Slutsky’s Lemma, (A.7), (A.8), (A.9), (A.10) and (A.11) that
√
d
n(b
α2S − α)−→ N (0, σα2 ),

where

α2 ν12
σ12 σ22
+
2
+ 2
q2
q2
q
α2 E[Λi φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]V (θ̂)E[zi φ(zi0 θ)Λi ]
αE[Λi φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]E[θ̂i ]E[Λi ]
=
−
2
E[Λ2i ]2
E[Λ2i ]2
α2 E[Λ2i Φ(zi0 θ)(1 − Φ(zi0 θ))]
σ2
+
+
.
E[Λ2i ]2
E[Λ2i ]

σα2 =

With θ̂ and i uncorrelated conditionally on zi and wi the covariance term is zero,

125

and the variance reduces to

σα2 =

α2 E[Λi φ(zi0 θ)zi0 ]V (θ̂)E[zi φ(zi0 θ)Λi ] α2 E[Λ2i Φ(zi0 θ)(1 − Φ(zi0 θ))]
σ2
+
+
E[Λ2i ]2
E[Λ2i ]2
E[Λ2i ]

A consistent estimator for this asymptotic variance can be defined by

σ̂α2 =

2
2
α̂2S
ν̂22 σ̂ 2
ν̂12 α̂2S
+
+
q̂ 2
q̂ 2
q̂

where
n

ν̂12 =

1 Xb
Λi φ(zi0 θ̂)zi0
n i=1
ν̂22

!

n

1X
bi
zi φ(zi0 θ̂)Λ
n i=1

Vb (θ̂)

!
,

n


1X 2
0
0
=
Λ̂ Φ(zi θ̂) 1 − Φ(zi θ̂) ,
n i=1 i




2
1X 
0
2
0
0
0
σ̂ =
yi − xi β̂ − α̂2S Φ(zi θ̂) − α̂2S Φ(zi θ̂) 1 − Φ(zi θ̂) ,
n i
2

n

n

n

1X 2
1X
1X
q̂ =
Λ̂i =
Φ(zi0 θ̂)2 −
Φ(zi0 θ̂)x0i
n i=1
n i=1
n i=1
and α̂2S is our proposed estimator of α.
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!

n

1X
xi x0i
n i=1

!−1

!
n
1X
xi Φ(zi0 θ̂) ,
n i=1

APPENDIX B

Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Let Assumptions 1-4 hold and assume that the covariance matrix of the joint
distribution of errors Σ defined in (2.5) is positive definite. Then our model can be
estimated jointly using full information maximum likelihood. The log-likelihood
function is built from the joint density of yi , δi∗ and di , which we write as the
product of the conditional and the marginal densities

f (δi∗ , di , yi ) = f (δi∗ , di |yi )f (yi ).

To derive the conditional distributions, we use results for the trivariate normal, and
write
vi = ρ1 i /σ + ρ2 ui + ηi ,

with ηi |i , ui ∼ N (0, κ2 )

where ρ1 , ρ2 and κ2 are defined in terms of the original parameters ϕv , ϕu and ρ by:1

ρ1 =

ϕv − ρϕu
,
1 − ϕ2u

ρ2 =

ρ − ϕv ϕu
,
1 − ϕ2u

κ2 = 1 − ρ21 − ρ22 − 2ρ1 ρ2 ϕu

Denote Θ = (θ0 , γ 0 , ρ, ϕu , ϕv , β 0 , α, σ 2 )0 the vector of all the parameters of the model.
Then,

1

The fact that the covariance matrix of the joint distribution of errors is constrained to be positive
definite guarantees that these new parameters are well-defined, namely, 0 < ρ1 < 1, 0 < ρ2 < 1, and
κ2 > 0.
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Υ11i (Θ) = f (δi∗ = 1, di = 1|yi ) = Φ2

zi0 θ + ρ1 (yi − α − x0i β)/σ 0
ρ
p
p 2
γ,
,
w
i
ρ22 + κ2
ρ22 + κ2
zi0 θ

!

+ ρ1 (yi − α −
p
− Υ11i (Θ)
ρ22 + κ2
!
zi0 θ + ρ1 (yi − x0i β)/σ
p
= 1 − Υ11i (Θ) − Υ10i (Θ)
ρ22 + κ2

Υ10i (Θ) = f (δi∗ = 1, di = 0|yi ) = Φ

Υ0i (Θ) = f (δi∗ = 0|yi ) = 1 − Φ

x0i β)/σ

!

where Φ2 (·, ·, ·) is the CDF of the standard bivariate normal distribution.
The full information log-likelihood function of the model is then defined by

l(Θ) =

n
X

li (Θ),

i=1

with


1
yi − α − x0i β
li (Θ) = δi ln Υ11i (Θ) φ
+
σ
σ





yi − α − x0i β
yi − x0i β
1
1
+ (1 − δi ) ln Υ10i (Θ) φ
+ Υ0i (Θ) φ
σ
σ
σ
σ


(B.1)

Maximizing this function with respect to Θ yields a consistent and asymptotically
efficient estimator of the model parameters.
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APPENDIX C

Extension to Binary Outcomes
The method discussed in this paper can be extended to the case of binary outcomes.
However, in this case we can not just do the plug-in method described earlier,
because a linear probability model would exhibit serious problems, especially the
fact that it could produce a wrong sign for the treatment effect, even if the
treatment status is correctly classified (see, e.g., discussion provided by Lewbel,
Dong & Yang 2012). A more reliable alternative in this case would be the maximum
likelihood estimation. We assume the binary outcome yi is related to the exogenous
covariates xi and to the true treatment indicator δi∗ by
yi = 1 [x0i β + δi∗ α + i > 0] .

(C.1)

True participation δi∗ and misreporting di are defined, as before, by equations (3.2)
and (3.4), respectively. We maintain Assumptions 1-4 above, except that the
conditional variance of the error i is now normalized to 1 (as is usually the case for
identification in Probit models). Given the observed participation δi = δi∗ di , and the
outcome yi , the log-likelihood function of the binary choice model (BCM) is built up
from the joint probabilities Pr[yi , δi∗ , di ] of these dichotomous variables as follows.

lBCM (Θ) =

n
X

δi ln Pr[yi , δi∗ = 1, di = 1]+
(C.2)

i=1

+ (1 − δi ) ln (Pr[yi , δi∗ = 1, di = 0] + Pr[yi , δi∗ = 0])
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where

Pr[yi , δi∗ = 1, di = 1] = Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 1]yi Pr[yi = 0, δi∗ = 1, di = 1]1−yi ,
Pr[yi , δi∗ = 1, di = 0] = Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 0]yi Pr[yi = 0, δi∗ = 1, di = 0]1−yi ,
and

Pr[yi , δi∗ = 0] = Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 0]yi Pr[yi = 0, δi∗ = 0]1−yi

The probabilities in these equations can be obtained in terms of model parameters:

Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 1] = Φ3 (x0i β + α, zi0 θ, wi0 γ; ϕv , ϕu , ρ)
Pr[yi = 0, δi∗ = 1, di = 1] = Φ2 (zi0 θ, wi0 γ; ρ) − Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 1]
Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 0] = Φ2 (x0i β + α, wi0 γ; ϕv ) − Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 1]
Pr[yi = 0, δi∗ = 1, di = 0] = Φ (zi0 θ) − Φ2 (zi0 θ, wi0 γ; ρ) − Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 1, di = 0]
Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 0] = Φ (x0i β) − Φ2 (x0i β, zi0 θ; ϕv )
Pr[yi = 0, δi∗ = 0] = 1 − Φ (zi0 θ) − Pr[yi = 1, δi∗ = 0]
where Φ3 (·, ·, ·) is the CDF of the standard trivariate normal distribution.
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